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POLITICS AND CIVIL
PROCEDURE RULEMAKING:
REFLECTIONS ON EXPERIENCE
PAUL D. CARRINGTON†
ABSTRACT
This Article is a reflection on personal experience as well as an
account of what has happened to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in the most recent quarter century. It observes that the Supreme Court
of the United States has assigned to itself a role in making procedural
law inconsistent with the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 or any morerecent utterance of Congress. This procedural law made by the Court
is responsive to the desire of business interests to weaken the ability of
citizens to enforce laws enacted to protect them from business
misconduct. The Article concludes with the suggestion that Congress
should now act to constrain the role of the Court and restore the
ability of citizens to enforce their rights in civil proceedings in federal
courts.
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I. INTRODUCTION: A FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE
This Article protests the lack of respect shown by the Supreme
Court of the United States for the political process devised in 1934 by
all three branches of the federal government to better suit rules of
civil procedure to the protection and enforcement of legal rights in
1
civil proceedings. Under that 1934 law, the Court has a specific but
limited role in rulemaking. Congress also has a role. So do the
Judicial Conference of the United States (Judicial Conference), and,
at least indirectly, the Executive Branch. And so does the Federal
Judicial Center, established in 1967 to provide empirical data
informing rulemakers about the consequences of the rules for which
they share responsibility. But in recent decades, the Supreme Court
has manifested dissatisfaction with its modest share of the power to
make procedural law and has in its opinions proclaimed new rules
having no basis in texts enacted through the established rulemaking
process or in any empirical data.

1. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(2006)).
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The new procedural law made by the Court manifests political
objectives and gives special meaning to the term “judicial activism.”
Its creation weakens the enforcement of public laws by private
citizens. It thus conforms to the deregulation or tort-reform politics
favored by many business interests.
As a sometime participant in the traditional rulemaking process,
I seek in this Article to place the Court’s ventures in historical and
political perspective. If, as I contend, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (Civil Rules) should still be made by the process
established in 1934 and now conducted by the Judicial Conference, it
is imperative that Congress communicate to the Supreme Court its
disapproval of the Court’s freewheeling rewriting of the Civil Rules.
And the Senate might usefully place the issue on the agenda for
Supreme Court nomination hearings.
To advance this contention, I must first disclose my personal role
in the events recorded here. I was quite surprised in 1985 to get a call
from Chief Justice Burger offering me an appointment as Reporter to
the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules (Advisory Committee). I
probably owed that call to the influence of Professor Maurice
Rosenberg, my sometime coconspirator in law reform and sometime
2
coauthor. Professor Rosenberg tended to overrate my modest skill as
a politician. And he was at the time an academic member of the
Advisory Committee and was thus surely consulted by the Chief
Justice in the selection of a new Reporter. The Chief was probably
looking for political talent to help address the rising political stress on
procedural rulemaking that had become a serious concern beginning
3
in the 1970s.
That stress would continue through my tenure and beyond,
evolving into the crisis that procedural rulemaking now faces in 2010
4
as a result of the Court’s interventions. During my time on the staff
2. Professor Rosenberg was the chair of the Advisory Council on Appellate Justice, 1971–
1975 (funded by the Federal Judicial Center and Law Enforcement Assistance Administration)
of which I was a member. We were coauthors of a book with Daniel J. Meador, PAUL D.
CARRINGTON, DANIEL J. MEADOR & MAURICE ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL (1976), and
I authored an obituary saluting his memory, Paul D. Carrington, Maurice Rosenberg, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1901 (1995).
3. For a contemporaneous assessment of the political challenges facing the Supreme
Court in the rulemaking process, see generally Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of
the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673 (1975).
4. For a compact account of the destabilizing impact of the revised pleading standard on
the civil litigation system, see generally Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing
Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821 (2010).
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of the rulemakers, I participated in numerous controversies. I briefly
recount these controversies in this Article to illuminate the
rulemaking process with which Supreme Court Justices have
increasingly manifested discontent.
II. THE STATE OF FEDERAL LAW IN 1985
A. Federal Judicial Dockets
One cause for rising political concern radiating through the
federal judiciary in 1985 was the very substantial increase in the
5
federal caseload over the preceding two decades. That increase had
6
numerous causes. One was the growth of the criminal docket
7
resulting from numerous extensions of federal criminal law. Larger
criminal dockets stemmed in part from the then–newly proclaimed
8
War on Drugs and in part from the enhancement of the procedural
rights of the accused—most notably the advent of the right to
9
counsel—resulting in more contested cases. Another cause was the
substantial increase in the number of civil actions filed by citizens
seeking enforcement of civil rights or civil liberties, especially those
filed by prisoners attacking their convictions or invoking the newly
10
established rights of citizens in prison. Other new categories of civil

5. The number of civil cases pending in district courts in 1965 was 74,395. WARREN
OLNEY III, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1965, at 88 (1965). The
comparable number in 1985 was 254,114. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 276 (1985).
6. For contemporaneous accounts of the many sources of the caseload increase, see
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 59–93 (1985); Wolf
Heydebrand & Carroll Seron, The Rising Demand for Court Services: A Structural Explanation
of the Caseload of U.S. District Courts, 11 JUST. SYS. J. 303, 313–20 (1986).
7. There were 31,569 criminal cases filed in 1965, OLNEY, supra note 5, at 88, and 10,834
cases pending, id. at 89. There were 38,245 criminal cases filed in 1985, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, supra note 5, at 336, and 22,229 cases pending, id. at 337.
8. The literature on this war is abundant. For an account of the War on Drugs attentive to
its impact on the courts, see generally JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED
AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT: A JUDICIAL INDICTMENT OF THE WAR ON DRUGS (2001).
9. See SHELDON KRANTZ ET AL., THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES: THE
MANDATE OF ARGERSINGER V. HAMLIN 1 (1976) (noting that recognizing the right to counsel
“placed significant new burdens on the criminal justice system”).
10. See generally DAVID RUDOVSKY, THE RIGHTS OF PRISONERS: THE BASIC ACLU
GUIDE TO A PRISONER’S RIGHTS 21–22, 26–27 (1973) (summarizing the legal rights of prisoners
at disciplinary hearings and to notice of rules governing prisoner conduct).
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filings included employment discrimination cases and cases brought
12
to enforce federal environmental laws. State supreme courts’
extensions of their states’ tort law to deter needless risk-taking by
13
manufacturers and other business firms may also have contributed
new diversity cases to federal court dockets. And there were perhaps
more contract disputes between business firms engaged in interstate
or international commerce.
The Supreme Court’s 1977 decision establishing the right of
lawyers to advertise their services may also have magnified the
14
caseloads in state and federal courts. And the advent of electronic
information storage perhaps began to elevate the relative cost of
15
discovery in some big commercial cases in the 1980s.
Most of these docket developments were linked to President
16
Lyndon Johnson’s search for the Great Society, a search that might
have been better and more moderately labeled a search for a Middle
Class Society. Great Society politics were a continuation of
Progressive and New Deal politics, which had long aimed to increase
and enforce the rights of citizens by providing equal protection to
17
all. These politics were, at least in part, a continuing reaction against

11. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in
Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 115–17 (2009). For
information about the disfavor that these cases have come to arouse among federal appellate
judges, see id. at 112–15.
12. See generally JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND POLICY 77–79 (3d ed. 2010) (“Every major federal environmental law passed since 1970
. . . has contained a citizen suit provision.”).
13. Instrumental in extensions of tort law were WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS (1st ed. 1941), and published opinions of the California Chief Justice Roger
Traynor. BEN FIELD, ACTIVISM IN PURSUIT OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE JURISPRUDENCE
OF CHIEF JUSTICE ROGER J. TRAYNOR, at xiv, 105–06 (2003).
14. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 379 (1977). For an account of the extension of the right
to advertise, see 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF LAWYER ADVERTISING 85–110 (2006). For a
compact assessment of the consequences of the decision, see generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
Advertising and Intermediaries in Provision of Legal Services: Bates in Retrospect and Prospect,
37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 307 (2005).
15. See Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J.
561, 564–65 (2001) (discussing the impact of computer technology on litigation and the new and
unforeseen costs and burdens of electronic discovery).
16. For a full account of the Great Society, see generally THE GREAT SOCIETY AND THE
HIGH TIDE OF LIBERALISM (Sidney M. Milkis & Jerome M. Mileur eds., 2005).
17. Multiple commentators have provided accounts of political developments prior to the
Great Society. See, e.g., MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, PEACEFUL REVOLUTION: CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE AND AMERICAN CULTURE FROM PROGRESSIVISM TO THE NEW DEAL (2000);
MAUREEN A. FLANAGAN, AMERICA REFORMED: PROGRESSIVES AND PROGRESSIVISMS 1890–
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the Industrial Revolution–inspired anarchism and Marxism that
18
flourished in America during the economic crisis of the 1930s. And
they generally had the support of a vibrant labor movement.
B. The Relation of 1985 Dockets to the 1934 Act and Private
Enforcement of Public Law
The Great Society–inspired increases to federal court caseloads
were not entirely coincidental to the vision of civil procedure
19
embodied in the 1934 Rules Act. The aim of that reform, first
vigorously advanced in the United States at the federal level by the
early-twentieth-century Progressives, was to enforce all the legal
rights of citizens, whether derived from legislation or from state and
20
federal constitutions. The Progressives, in turn, drew their ideas
21
from thoughts being expressed throughout the nineteenth century
and perhaps from earlier thoughts attributed to the Protestant

1920 (2007); WILL MORRISEY, THE DILEMMA OF PROGRESSIVISM: HOW ROOSEVELT, TAFT,
AND WILSON RESHAPED THE AMERICAN REGIME OF SELF-GOVERNMENT (2009).

18. See generally PAUL AVRICH, ANARCHIST VOICES: AN ORAL HISTORY OF ANARCHISM
oral histories of anarchists in the United States); COMMUNISM IN
AMERICA: A HISTORY IN DOCUMENTS (Albert Fried ed., 1997) (compiling a broad range of
documents on the history of American Communism); ALONZO VAN DEUSEN, RATIONAL
COMMUNISM: THE PRESENT AND FUTURE REPUBLIC OF NORTH AMERICA (New York, Soc.
Sci. Publ’g Co. 1885) (defending communism against its critics and articulating a vision of a
communist society).
19. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(2006)).
20. The evolution of the politics of twentieth-century law reform can be traced back to the
natural rights movement. See generally JUSTICE: A READER (Michael J. Sandel ed., 2007)
(compiling classic and modern readings on human rights and philosophy); THE PHILOSOPHY OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (Patrick Hayden ed., 2001) (same). From there, progressivism and populism
played a critical role in American political development. See generally ROBERT WYNESS
MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1952)
(surveying the historical progression of procedural rules in English and American courts);
WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS
CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890–1937 (1994) (chronicling the impact on judicial behavior of the
judicial-reform efforts between 1890 and 1937). For a more-focused discussion of the relation
between the Progressives’ vision of reform and the Rules Enabling Act, see EDWARD A.
PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL
POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 28–
33 (2000); Charles E. Clark & James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure: I. The
Background, 44 YALE L.J. 387 (1935).
21. See J. Newton Fiero, Report of Committee on Uniformity of Procedure and
Comparative Law, 19 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 411, 436–38 (1896) (“[A]uthorizing judges . . . to
select . . . lawyers familiar with the procedure in this and other countries . . . [to draft simplified
procedural rules] will give an opportunity for a close, careful and painstaking investigation into
the methods of procedure . . . [used] throughout the English speaking world . . . .”).
IN AMERICA (1995) (compiling
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Enlightenment, which emphasized the role of the individual
22
celebrant. In the twentieth century, Progressive ambitions gained the
vigorous support of the newly well-organized legal profession.
The American idea of engaging judges in the crafting of
23
procedural law had a nineteenth-century English origin. In the
twentieth century, the American Bar Association (ABA) took up the
24
cause and secured the passage of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,
25
which granted the judicial branch authority to craft procedural rules.
The aims of those who wrote the 1934 statute and of the Advisory
26
Committee that wrote the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
were expressed in Rule 1: “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
27
determination of every action.” The rules were, at last, to facilitate
the assertion of civil claims and assure that meritorious claims based
on discoverable facts were promptly recognized and enforced. The
right to discover evidence would become a key feature transforming
federal courts into effective instruments of public civil law
28
enforcement.
The 1938 Civil Rules were the product of a committee of
eminent lawyers led by Homer Cummings, the attorney general of the
United States, and served by Charles Clark of the Yale Law School.

22. For recent accounts of the significance of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
Protestant thought, see WAYNE HUDSON, ENLIGHTENMENT AND MODERNITY: THE ENGLISH
DEISTS AND REFORM (2009) (making a revisionist argument for the significance of the English
deists in the Protestant Enlightenment); KIERON O’HARA, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: A
BEGINNER’S GUIDE (2010) (describing the history and ideas of the Enlightenment and their
impact).
23. See SAMUEL ROSENBAUM, THE RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY IN THE ENGLISH
SUPREME COURT 1–6 (1917).
24. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(2006)).
25. See generally Charles E. Clark, Edson Sunderland and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 58 MICH. L. REV. 6 (1959) (eulogizing Edson Sutherland and his role in shaping the
Civil Rules on the Supreme Court’s Advisory Committee); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U.
PA. L. REV. 909 (1987) (examining the triumph of equity rules over the common law and its
implications for contemporary civil procedure).
26. For a brief but illuminating account of the beginnings of the Civil Rules, see CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 426–32 (5th ed. 1994).
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. For suggested reform to this rule, see Robert G. Bone, Improving
Rule 1: A Master Rule for the Federal Rules, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 287 (2010).
28. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of
Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 535–37 (2001); Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed:
The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 739–40
(1998).
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The committee solicited public comment, which enabled it to see the
diverse ramifications of proposed texts. This political process had
several virtues: transparency, disinterest, access to advice and
empirical data, and a measure of accountability to all three branches
29
of government. The Supreme Court has explicitly acknowledged
30
these merits twice in recent times, but the present Justices seem, at
31
least at times, to have overlooked them.
To the extent that the Progressive reformers achieved their aims,
private citizens gained the ability to enforce many diverse laws
enacted or proclaimed to protect public interests as well as their own.
In recognition of that reality, by the 1960s, the United States was
moving away from the New Deal reliance on administrative agencies
to protect the public interest from harms caused by risky business
32
practices. Related to this evolution was the growing awareness that
government agencies assigned to protect the public from harms
caused by the indifference or greed of business interests have a
tendency, over time, to be captured by the very interests they were
33
organized to regulate. Citizens represented by their own private
lawyers are generally less vulnerable to such capture than are public
officials. This sometimes-costly scheme of business regulation is
imposed ex post. Business decisionmakers without administrative
oversight are freer to take risks in search of profits but are more
exposed to adverse consequences than if they were regulated ex ante
29. On the subsequent evolution of the process, see Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted
Mirror: The Supreme Court’s Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the
Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 181–92 (1988).
30. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998) (“[Q]uestions regarding pleading,
discovery, and summary judgment are most frequently and most effectively resolved either by
the rulemaking process or the legislative process.”); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (“[Changes to the rules] must be
obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.”).
31. See infra Part VIII.
32. For a definitive essay on public law litigation, see Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge
in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). I have made this point about the shift
to enforcing laws through the courts more elaborately in Paul D. Carrington, A New
Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.J. 929, 933–44 (1996). Chayes’s
essay may be seen as a reflection of legal process theory and the thinking of Lon Fuller and
others critical of the cynicism of legal realism. For a critique of legal realism written
contemporaneously with the Rules Enabling Act, see L.L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82
U. PA. L. REV. 429 (1934). For a modern elaboration, see Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory
of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of
Litigation, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1273 (1995).
33. James Landis penned a striking assessment of the capture problem. See JAMES M.
LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (1960).
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by public officers. A nation that often eschews the idea of strong or
intrusive government may require this form of business regulation to
constrain harmful business practices.
34
For these reasons and perhaps others, both states and the
federal government embraced civil litigation conducted pursuant to
35
the Civil Rules as envisioned in the 1930s. By the 1960s, this form of
litigation had become in many minds a preferred form of regulating
business in the public interest. This sense of public purpose led the
Judicial Conference to propose and secure the creation of the Federal
36
Judicial Center in 1967, in the hope that the data it might gather
would inform rulemakers and result in procedural rules becoming
more efficient instruments for the enforcement of public laws and
citizens’ legal rights. This improved enforcement would, the Judicial
Conference hoped, modify businesses’ behavior, making our social
37
order more just.
C. The Deregulation Movement
A countervailing political force arose to resist this form of
privatized business regulation. That force finds its roots in Adam
Smith’s eighteenth-century celebration of the free market as a source

34. Others may attribute the development to the influence of “rent-seeking” lawyers, issuegroup interests, budget constraints, or party politics. See Sean Farhang, Public Regulation and
Private Lawsuits in the American Separation of Powers System, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 821, 826–28
(2008).
35. See John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354,
383 (2003) (concluding that the trend toward greater state conformity with the Civil Rules had
reversed itself); John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey
of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L REV. 1367, 1427 (1986) (noting that the
rules of civil procedure in twenty-three of fifty-one jurisdictions were replicas of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and a substantial majority of jurisdictions used a system at least
substantially similar to the federal rules).
36. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 620–629 (2006) (establishing the Federal Judicial Center). For a
history of the Center, see Denise L. Arial, History of the Federal Judiciary: The Federal Judicial
Center, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_18.html (last
visited Oct. 23, 2010).
37. Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937, 938–40
(1975) (describing the “Behavior Modification Model” as a way of imposing costs on individuals
to alter behavioral choices). See generally Owen M. Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of
Adjudication, 6 J.L. & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1982) (critiquing the dispute resolution model of
adjudication and describing the importance of structural reform litigation focusing on large
organizations). Professor Terence Halliday observed that Max Weber had celebrated this
American impulse to rationalize legal institutions as the essence of Western culture. TERENCE
C. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, AND PROFESSIONAL
EMPOWERMENT 23–26 (1987).

CARRINGTON IN FINAL.DOC

2010]

11/29/2010 6:56:44 PM

POLITICS AND CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES

607

38

of public good and has sometimes been led by lawyers whose careers
39
are invested in representing business interests. Advocates of
deregulation often discount the many risks to distant others that
result from business practices extended over substantial distances.
40
But as Adam Smith himself observed, business decisionmakers are
disinclined to bear costs to diminish risks to distant workers,
consumers, investors, passengers, patients, franchisees, tenants, or
others.
Deregulation became the battle cry of business interests such as
41
those represented by the United States Chamber of Commerce. One
form of deregulation politics challenged the procedural reforms that
enabled private citizens to enforce diverse claims—and coincidentally
to enforce sundry public laws. Advocates of this kind of deregulation
urged that the costs and delays of excessive litigation were disabling
American businesses from competing in the global economy that our
42
nation aspired to enlarge. The available data on the growth in the

38. See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS (R.H. Campbell, A.S. Skinner & W.B. Todd eds., Clarendon Press reprt.
1979) (1776) (advocating an economic system of natural liberty).
39. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the
Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 1000 (2000).
40. See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 135–37 (D.D. Raphael &
A.L. Macfie eds., Liberty Classics 1982) (1759) (recounting the relative indifference of his
Glasgow neighbors to distant tragedies); see also DOĞAN GÖÇMEN, THE ADAM SMITH
PROBLEM: RECONCILING HUMAN NATURE AND SOCIETY IN THE THEORY OF MORAL
SENTIMENTS AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (2007) (examining the contrasting conception of
human nature in Adam Smith’s two most noted works).
41. See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992) (elaborating on the interconnectedness
of regulation and free markets); M.E. BEESLEY, PRIVATIZATION, REGULATION AND
DEREGULATION (1997) (providing a collection of essays on the economic effects of
privatization and regulation); DEREGULATION OR RE-REGULATION? REGULATORY REFORM
IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (Giandomenico Majone ed., 1990) (assessing
developments in regulation in Europe and America, exploring the implications of European
Community regulation, and analyzing the political economy of regulation); WILLIS EMMONS,
THE EVOLVING BARGAIN: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF DEREGULATION AND
PRIVATIZATION (2000) (describing how new forms of regulation can come with market
reforms); ALAN SHIPMAN, THE MARKET REVOLUTION AND ITS LIMITS: A PRICE FOR
EVERYTHING (1999) (analyzing the free market worldwide after the “Market Revolution” and
discussing the continuing existence of regulation); DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE
COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKETPLACE
THAT IS REMAKING THE MODERN WORLD (1998) (describing the shift toward more open
markets).
42. Stephen J. Carroll provides a contemporaneous assessment of the ways the American
liability system limits U.S. competition abroad. See STEPHEN J. CARROLL WITH NICHOLAS
PACE, ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM 35–36 (1987); see also GUSTAVE H.
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civil dockets of the federal courts, however, substantially weakened
the argument: there was remarkable growth in the number of cases,
but much of the growth was in prisoner complaints and other pro se
43
cases. In Judge Jack Weinstein’s words, the business community’s
stated concerns about case overload were a “weapon of perception,
44
not substance.”
Nevertheless sensitive to business complaints, Chief Justice
Burger in 1976 had called for a national conference in his hometown
of St. Paul to honor Roscoe Pound, a law reformer in his time.
45
Pound’s address to the ABA at that place in 1906 had invigorated
the political efforts of the ABA that had resulted in the 1934 Rules
46
Enabling Act. Although the conference’s primary consequence was
47
to stimulate the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) movement,
there was a shared sense that 1979 was a time to consider more
reform. Chief Justice Burger had by then reduced the number of

SHUBERT, SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE NEED FOR TORT REFORM 11 (1986) (describing
various problems with the civil justice system including the disadvantages of vacillation between
a purely compensatory system and a fault-based liability system); LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCS.,
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND TORT LAW REFORM 3 (1987)
(providing a survey showing that Americans think the civil justice system is overused and the
problem is growing).
43. See Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 17 (1986)
(explaining that “five categories of cases—recovery of overpayments, social security cases,
prisoner petitions, torts, and civil rights cases—account for almost three-quarters of the entire
increase in filings”); see also Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the
“Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and
Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 989–90 (2003) (arguing that the growth in
number of cases was due, in part, to the provision of legal services to those previously unable to
obtain representation).
44. Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the
Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1909 (1989).
45. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
14 AM. LAW. 445 (1906); see also Barry Friedman, Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice: A Retrospective (and a Look Ahead), 82 IND. L.J. 1193, 1193 (2007)
(providing a retrospective analysis of Pound’s speech).
46. See THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 289–94 (A.
Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979) (describing the short-term and long-term effects of
Pound’s speech). See generally William H. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations:
A Blueprint for the Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277 (1978)
(summarizing Pound’s recommendations and noting the work done to respond to his concerns).
47. In 2006, the International Academy of Mediators awarded Frank Sander a medal for
his efforts beginning at that conference. Awards, INT’L ACAD. OF MEDIATORS, http://
www.iamed.org/awards.cfm (last visited Oct. 25, 2010). See generally Michael L. Moffitt, Before
the Big Bang: The Making of an ADR Pioneer, 22 NEGOTIATION J. 437, 437–39 (2006)
(providing a brief biography of Frank Sander).
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lawyers and professors engaged in civil rulemaking so that the
48
Advisory Committee was dominated by the judges that he selected.
Champions of the deregulation cause acquired substantial
49
control of the federal government in the elections of 1980. And in
the era following those elections, business interests recognizing the
political role of the judiciary and seeking deregulation secured
appointment of a controlling majority of Supreme Court Justices and
50
federal judges. Especially after the appointments of Chief Justice
John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito by President George W. Bush,
the Court’s work has evidenced a probusiness shift that seems to have
magnified the Court’s demonstrated inclination to weaken private
51
enforcement of public laws regulating business.
D. The Cost of Law Enforcement: Discovery
52

Cost is, of course, an ancient grievance against law.
interests’ complaints were often directed specifically
associated with the discovery process that was
distinguishing feature of civil procedure under the 1938

But business
at the costs
the central,
53
Civil Rules.

48. See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1714–15 (2004) (explaining Chief Justice Warren Burger’s impact
on the selection of Advisory Committee members).
49. See ANDREW E. BUSCH, REAGAN’S VICTORY: THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1980
AND THE RISE OF THE RIGHT 98–144 (2005) (detailing the general election of 1980); MICHAEL
KAZIN, THE POPULIST PERSUASION: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 245–68 (1995) (providing an
illuminating account of the relation of the deregulation movement to American populism).
50. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE
JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 127–28 (2006)
(describing a conservative move in the Supreme Court after 1980 but showing the challenges of
documenting that trend in lower federal courts).
51. See Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court:
Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1531–32 (2008)
(elaborating on the probusiness nature of a majority of Supreme Court cases during the October
Term of 2006); see also A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 353, 353 (2010) (employing the less-aggressive term “restrictive ethos” to denote
the Court’s transformative political aims).
52. Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter, in 3
LECTURES ON LEGAL TOPICS 87, 89 (1926) (“[I]n the third millennium before Christ men were
complaining about the inefficiency of legal procedure, and I fancy that if any of you are destined
in the year 7000 A.D. to revisit . . . you will be obliged to report . . . that mankind still exhibits
the same discontentment with its methods of adjusting human differences . . . .”).
53. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37; cf. GEORGE RAGLAND, DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL (1932)
(discussing professional experiences of administering discovery in pretrial procedure). See
generally Subrin, supra note 28 (giving the historical context of the 1938 Civil Rules concerning
discovery). For background on the development of practice under these rules, see generally
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These discovery rules had enabled many citizens and firms to conduct
private investigations of business practices threatening harm to
consumers, passengers, tenants, workers, patients, or franchisees. As
Judge Weinstein observed, the motives of many of those seeking
reform of discovery practice were primarily substantive rather than
procedural: they sought economic advancement, perhaps especially
54
their own, if at the cost of decreasing civil justice. Some critics
believed that business interests were concerned more with the reality
that defendants were losing cases because facts were exposed by
partisan discovery than with the costs of discovery in the cases that
defendants were winning. Perhaps most unwelcome to business
interests was the cost of complying with laws that private plaintiffs,
armed with the right to investigate facts in dispute, were enforcing.
It bears notice that the alleged costly overuse of discovery might
also have been related to the entrenchment, in the third quarter of
the twentieth century, of business litigators’ practice of billing for
their services by the hour. This practice created a strong incentive in
55
big-stakes cases for lawyers to leave no discovery stone unturned.
Another factor in rising costs was the increasing use of expert
testimony, which had the secondary effect of engaging more of
lawyers’ time in studying subjects of expertise and examining
56
prospective witnesses and their data. By 1980, the available data
indicated that the problem of excessive use of discovery was—though
sometimes severe—largely a feature of big commercial cases in which
lawyers were billing heavily for their time. Abuse was less likely in

WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1968) (detailing
the debate over whether discovery rules have improved the adversary system).
54. Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural Reform as a Surrogate for Substantive Law Revision, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 827, 828–29 (1993) (“The procedural reforms of the 1930s would have been
only of passing interest had they not been accompanied and followed by the vast expansion of
federal substantive law that resulted from the . . . growth and liberalization of the common law
in areas such as torts and contracts.”).
55. See generally WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE HONEST HOUR: THE ETHICS OF TIME-BASED
BILLING BY ATTORNEYS (1996) (discussing the ethical issues that arise from the billable-hour
system).
56. Whether this profligate use of opinion testimony has enhanced the quality of decisions
has seldom been examined. See generally Peter Huber, Medical Experts and the Ghost of
Galileo, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119 (Summer 1991) (discussing the courts’
overinclusiveness of dubious expert testimony); Deborah R. Hensler, Science in the Court: Is
There a Role for Alternative Dispute Resolution, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171 (Summer
1991) (addressing whether alternative dispute resolution could help courts deal with scientific
questions in cases).
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cases carrying lesser financial consequences, such as civil rights
57
litigation.
E. The 1983 Amendments
In 1983, the Court, acting on the advice of the Judicial
Conference and with the assent of Congress, promulgated numerous
revisions of the Civil Rules. Some of the 1983 amendments
specifically responded to the concerns expressed by business interests
58
and provided judges with “a blueprint for management” of big cases
59
to constrain abuses of discovery. The Court also promulgated an
amendment to Rule 11 that authorized judges to punish lawyers for
advancing meritless contentions that wasted the courts’ attention and
60
their adversaries’ money.
The idea of managerial judging, as envisioned by these 1983
amendments, emerged in the early 1970s at training seminars for
rookie federal judges, and that first evolved at a time when the
federal criminal and prisoner-petition caseloads were growing
61
dramatically. Case management entailed increased engagement of

57. See generally JOSEPH L. EBERSOLE & BARLOW BURKE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
DISCOVERY PROBLEMS IN CIVIL CASES 18–29 (1980) (discussing the issue of over-discovery);
Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers’ Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems
and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787 (providing lawyers’ views on the discovery
system); Wayne D. Brazil, Improving Judicial Controls over the Pretrial Development of Civil
Actions: Model Rules for Case Management and Sanctions, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 873
(proposing a model rule for pretrial actions and modifications to the Advisory Committee’s
proposed revisions of Rule 16); Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A
Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978) [hereinafter Brazil, Adversary
Character] (arguing that the adversarial nature of discovery impedes the actual discovery
process); David L. Shapiro, Some Problems of Discovery in an Adversary System, 63 MINN. L.
REV. 1055 (1979) (examining the gap between the theory and practice of discovery); David M.
Trubek, Austin Sarat, William L.F. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritzer & Joel B. Grossman, The
Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72 (1983) (analyzing the amount of time and
money spent in processing litigation).
58. ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND
LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 20 (1984).
59. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment (“Excessive
discovery . . . pose[s] significant problems.”).
60. See id. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment (“Greater attention by the
district courts to pleading and motion abuses and the imposition of sanctions when appropriate,
should discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline the litigation process by
lessening frivolous claims or defenses.”).
61. See Judith Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial and Congressional
Rulemaking on Civil Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49 ALA. L. REV. 133, 176–77 (1997)
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judges in the conduct of pretrial proceedings for the purpose of
62
preventing wasteful discovery. The Federal Judicial Center provided
63
guidance in the available case-management methods. Contrary to
occasional protests, managerial practices seem to have worked
64
reasonably well in the big cases for which they were designed. And
the Supreme Court did not express misgivings about the adequacy of
the practice to control the excessive infliction of costs on adversaries
65
until 2007.
Business interests’ complaints regarding the cost of pretrial
litigation in commercial and public law cases seem to have been
substantially overblown. A 2009 study by the Federal Judicial Center
confirms that, with the exception of a very few outlying cases, the cost
of discovery and related pretrial proceedings is minor in relation to
the stakes in the cases, ranging from 1.6 percent to 3.3 percent of the
66
amounts in dispute.
67
But case management was nevertheless not without critics.
Judges increasingly delegated managerial tasks to growing staffs of
68
magistrates and clerks, perhaps because the tasks were sometimes
deemed tedious and unworthy of the valued attention of judges
(discussing judicial education on judges’ managerial roles and the beneficial aspects of
promoting freely negotiated settlements).
62. See generally WILLIAM W SCHWARZER, MANAGING ANTITRUST AND OTHER
COMPLEX LITIGATION: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES (1982) (elaborating on the
necessity for judicial involvement in antitrust and complex litigation cases); Robert F. Peckham,
A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning
and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253, 253–54 (1985) (discussing the
importance of judicial management of the pretrial process).
63. See generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) (1985) (outlining the
basic principles of complex litigation resolution and various procedures to successfully
implement these principles).
64. See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL,
CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 12–13 (2009).
65. Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94
IOWA L. REV. 873, 898–99 (2009) (“Until Twombly, the Supreme Court had never openly and
directly questioned the effectiveness of judicial discretion in managing litigation problems
during the pre-trial phase.”).
66. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 64, at 2.
67. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376, 380 (1982)
(“[M]anagerial judging may be redefining sub silentio our standards of what constitutes rational,
fair, and impartial adjudication.”).
68. See Patrick E. Higginbotham, A Few Thoughts on Judicial Supremacy: A Response to
Professors Carrington and Cramton, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 637, 648 (2009) (“The federal
appellate courts also deploy large numbers of staff council and hand off administrative tasks to
court clerks and circuit executives with their swelling staffs.”).
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appointed “for life,” or because Congress was not providing adequate
69
resources to deal with the caseloads. And parties faced increasing
pressure to settle or arbitrate, perhaps contributing to the present
70
state of affairs in which the public trial has largely vanished. Law is
presumably still being enforced in civil cases in federal courts, but it is
71
harder for us to see it happening in our vacant federal courtrooms.
The 1983 amendments facilitating judicial case management
were not sufficient to calm the unrest of those who saw themselves as
present or prospective defendants in civil cases. Business interests
continued to agitate for a revision of Rule 68 to deter parties from
refusing offers of judgment by exposing them to liability for
attorneys’ fees; this device would enable defendants to elevate the
72
pressure on plaintiffs to accept low early offers. Critics saw the
73
proposal as a device to weaken recently enacted civil rights law. At
its first public meeting in 1986, the Advisory Committee permanently
74
tabled this proposed revision of Rule 68.
69. Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of
Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 929–30 (2000) (“These policies entailed development of the
concepts of the federal courts as a distinctive and unique venue, of life-tenured judges as
hierarchically superior to but able to share jurisdiction with non-life-tenured ‘federal’ judges,
and of the judicial branch as appropriately advising Congress and the country about whether to
locate enforcement of new rights in the federal courts.”).
70. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 515–16 (2004) (explaining that
courts have seen a decrease in both the percentages and the total number of cases that go to
trial). The extent to which the expanded role of Rule 56 contributed to the phenomenon is
questionable. Compare Martin Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trials:
Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1330 (2005) (“Changes in the law
of summary judgment quite probably explain at least a large part of the dramatic reduction in
federal trials.”), with Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trial and Summary Judgment in Federal
Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 608–
09 (2004) (detailing the use of summary judgment to create pressure to settle a case).
71. See generally Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United States District
Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 745 (2010) (discussing the decline of trials in the district courts and the
subsequent effects on the administration of justice).
72. For an account of the history of this device, see Robert G. Bone, “To Encourage
Settlement”: Rule 68, Offers of Judgment and the History of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
102 NW. U. L. REV. 1561, 1562 (2008).
73. See Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641,
2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006)) (stating that in civil rights cases “the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a
reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs”). For recent comment on Rule 68, see Bone,
supra note 72, at 1608–10 (describing the controversy over the 1983 amendment proposal to
Rule 68).
74. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, FED. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
MEETING OF APRIL 21, 1986, MINUTES OF MEETING 1, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
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F. A Personal Experience: The Role of the Reporter
It was in this political arena that I was privileged to serve the
Advisory Committee as its Reporter. I worked for seven years with
four chairs of the Advisory Committee—Judges Frank Johnson, Joe
Weis, Frank Grady, and Sam Pointer—each of whom I admired as
the sort of judge one would seek when one’s life, business, or assets
were at stake in a courtroom. All were strongly committed to the
aims expressed in Rule 1: enforcing all legal rights as fully, as
efficiently, and as quickly as circumstances might permit. But our
shared efforts were nevertheless measured by the great Charles Alan
75
Wright as a “malaise.”
Two packages of proposed amendments to the Civil Rules that I
had a hand in drafting for the Advisory Committee went up the chain
of command to the Standing Committee, one in 1990 and another in
1992. Most, but not all, of our 1990 proposals became law in 1991, and
76
most of our 1992 proposals became law in 1993. As the second
package reached the Judicial Conference, Judge Pointer and I
concluded that it was time to bring my service as Reporter to an end.
My departure coincided with a reform in the Advisory
Committee’s operations to provide additional support for the
Reporter. Perhaps this reform was a result of the Administrative
Office concluding that the job had become more complex and
demanding than it had been during the first four decades following
77
the promulgation of the Civil Rules in 1938. Professor Edward
Cooper has done admirable work as my successor and has also had
the very able assistance of Professor Richard Marcus. But it seems
fair to say that even Professors Cooper and Marcus have not entirely
calmed the waters roiled by the partisan disputes in which I became
involved.

uscourts/RulesandPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV04-1986-min.pdf. See generally Steven B. Burbank,
Proposals to Amend Rule 68—Time to Abandon Ship, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 425 (1986)
(discussing the Advisory Committee’s view on the ineffectiveness of Rule 68).
75. See generally Charles Alan Wright, Foreword: The Malaise of Federal Rulemaking, 14
REV. LITIG. 1 (1994) (providing a survey of several federal rulemaking amendments).
76. Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 134 F.R.D. 525 (1991); Amendments
to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401 (1993).
77. Indeed, there was a brief time in 1956–58 when there was no Advisory Committee and
hence no Reporter. See Act of July 11, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2006)); see also Symposium, The Rule-Making Function and the
Judicial Conference of the United States, 21 F.R.D. 117 (1957) (discussing that legislation).
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III. SUBSTANTIAL POLITICAL ISSUES CONFRONTED
IN RULEMAKING: 1985–1992
A. Issue 1: Congress and the Rules Enabling Act
1. Proposals for Reform. One of the items percolating at the
time of my arrival as Reporter in 1985 was the Advisory Committee’s
concern over pending proposals to amend the Rules Enabling Act
itself. The proponent of the amendments was Congressman Robert
Kastenmeier, who was the only member of Congress in my time as
Reporter to take a serious interest in issues of judicial administration.
He represented the second district of Wisconsin for sixteen terms,
78
only to be defeated in 1990. I hope that it was not his willingness to
invest time and effort in the study and reform of judicial
79
administration that led to his defeat. He impressed me as one who
had a clear sense of what he was doing and a commitment to the
80
public good.
Congressman Kastenmeier’s 1985 proposed amendments to the
Rules Enabling Act were a response, at least in part, to the
scholarship of Professor Stephen Burbank, who had been temperately
critical of the 1934 establishment of a rulemaking process that lacked
full transparency and sensitivity to potential substantive
81
consequences. If there was a partisan connection between this
proposed reform of the Act and the larger political contest between
the Great Society advocates and the advocates of the deregulation of
business, I was not aware of the connection.
78. Kastenmeier, Robert William, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONGRESS,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=K000020 (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
79. See generally Larry Kramer, “The One-Eyed Are Kings”: Improving Congress’s Ability
to Regulate the Use of Judicial Resources, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73 (Summer 1991)
(describing the problems with congressional engagement in issues of judicial administration).
But see Avern Cohn, A Judge’s View of Congressional Action Affecting the Courts, 54 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 99 (Summer 1991) (questioning whether the creation of a new agency in
Congress will best improve congressional knowledge of events in the federal court system).
80. The federal courthouse in Madison bears his name, as does a lecture series at the
University of Wisconsin Law School. “In 1985, Kastenmeier received the Warren E. Burger
Award, presented by the institute for Court Management, and the Service Award of the
National Center for State Courts. In 1988, he was honored by the American Judicature Society
with its Justice Award for his contributions to improving the administration of justice.” The
Robert W. Kastenmeier Lecture, U. OF WIS. L. SCH., http://www.law.wisc.edu/alumni/
kastenmeier.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
81. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1015 (1982) (arguing that lawmaking requires substantive transparency in addition to
procedural safeguards).
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2. Politicization and Transsubstantivity. The two provisions of
the Kastenmeier proposal were intended to elevate the sensitivity of
the rulemaking process to political preferences and consequences.
The first idea was to open our proceedings to observers and
82
lobbyists. Judge Johnson and others were not happy with that
proposal, fearing that it would introduce interest-group politics into
the rulemaking process. There had been from the beginning a
practice of publishing proposed rules for public comment. But some
perceived that the 1934 vision of procedural rulemaking, as expressed
in the structure of the first Advisory Committee and in the abstract,
transsubstantive promise of Rule 1, aimed to avoid interest-group
politics and concentrate on effective enforcement of the law. Those
who opposed the change feared that lobbyists in our committee
meetings might deprive the rulemaking process of its disinterest, and
thus of its integrity and entitlement to public acceptance.
An example of disinterested rulemaking was the celebrated 1966
enlargement of the class action, which was approved by a unanimous
83
Advisory Committee. Could such reforms, motivated by an innocent
desire of rulemakers to serve the public good with more effective law
enforcement, be achieved if interest groups were invited to
participate in their deliberations? The Advisory Committee also
recalled that special interest amendments had wrecked the admirably
84
succinct New York Code of 1848 advanced by David Dudley Field in
the decades following its enactment. These changes were ultimately
embodied in the lengthy and uncelebrated Throop Code, assembled
in the 1880s to record what the state legislature had done to Field’s
85
Code in response to lobbying by the self-interested.
82. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 401, 102 Stat.
4642, 4649 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c) (2006)) (opening Judicial Conference
committee meetings to the public in most circumstances).
83. This occurred in the conference room of Covington & Burling LLP in Washington,
D.C., where the Advisory Committee was sitting as guests of committee member Dean
Acheson. The class-action enlargement was not presented at the time as a major political
reform. Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 386–87 (1967) (describing the
formulation of revised Federal Rule 23).
84. On Field’s role, see CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE
PLEADING 18–19 (1928). See generally DAUN VAN EE, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD AND THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE LAW (1986) (describing the life and work of David Dudley Field).
85. THROOP’S ANNOTATED CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Montgomery H. Throop ed., 1st
ed. 1886). For further discussion, see MILLAR, supra note 20, at 55–56; Stephen N. Subrin,
Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural
Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2046 (1989).
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The structure of the rulemaking process was designed to
encourage the making of transsubstantive rules. This purpose
reflected the thinking of the celebrated English theorist Jeremy
Bentham, who encouraged the separation of substance from
procedure to focus the courts’ attention more on effective law
enforcement and less on the intricacies of procedures fashioned
86
separately for each common law form of action. Perhaps relying
principally on the advice of David Dudley Field, numerous states in
87
the nineteenth century enacted laws embracing Bentham’s vision.
Those who designed and enacted the 1934 Rules Enabling Act did
not suppose that a procedure equally suited to all kinds of cases could
be devised, but if special rules for a substantive category of cases were
needed, their creation would be a task for Congress. Meanwhile, until
such a special need should appear, a politically unaccountable group
should work to serve the broad aims expressed by Bentham and
88
stated in Rule 1. Or so it was thought.
But after assessing the situation on the ground in 1985, it seemed
to the Advisory Committee unlikely that continued resistance to open
meetings would succeed. Procedural rules have substantive
consequences, and the 1985 Advisory Committee felt that those

86. 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of Judicial Procedure, with the Outlines of a Procedure
Code, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 5 (John Bowring ed., Edinburgh, William Tait
1843) (“By procedure, is meant the course taken for the execution of the laws [to accomplish]
the will declared, or supposed to be declared, . . . in each instance.”).
87. See generally DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, WHAT SHALL BE DONE WITH THE PRACTICE OF
THE COURTS? (1847), reprinted in 1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS
OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 226 (A.P. Sprague ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1884)
(considering whether a uniform code of pleading is practicable); MILLAR, supra note 20
(examining civil procedure in American trial courts); Steven N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and
the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311
(1988) (discussing the development of the Field Code).
88. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Securing the Normative Foundations of Litigation Reform, 86
B.U. L. REV. 1155, 1170 (2006) (suggesting that today’s reformers are uncertain about
transsubstantive rules); Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a
Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 739–40 (1975) (examining the tension between
individual issues and transsubstantive rules of procedure); Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice:
The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683,
1746–50 (1992) (noting that judges require discretion when applying transsubstantive rules, but
that this threatens the nature of the rules). Skepticism has been expressed in recent times. Rex
R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The Revolution of 1938 and Its Discontents, 61 OKLA. L.
REV. 275, 284–86 (2008) (explaining that the goals of the drafters of the Rules Enabling Act of
1934 were different from what reformers are trying to accomplish today). For a thoughtful
history of the idea, see David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in
Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371 (2010).
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affected by a change in the rules should be heard. These hearings
required wide distribution of the Reporter’s preliminary drafts
inviting public comment. A few interest groups did show up at
meetings in my time, and they were sometimes helpful, but they were
unable to muster material influence on an Advisory Committee
90
controlled by independent judges serving during good behavior.
Unlike Congressional lobbyists, they had no ability to affect the
careers of the life-tenured judges whom they lobbied.
3. Lobbying for Supersession. Before the advent of public
meetings, Judge Johnson as chair directed me to enlist resistance to
the second provision of Congressman Kastenmeier’s proposed
revision of the Rules Enabling Act to which the Advisory Committee
91
objected. This was the proposed repeal of the supersession clause
declaring that existing statutes in conflict with new rules are to “be of
no further force or effect.” The House of Representatives approved
92
the repeal, but the Advisory Committee believed that the clause
served to constrain conflicting and confusing interpretations of the
Civil Rules based on inferences drawn from previous substantive
93
enactments of Congress.
I succeeded in enlisting the aid of the ABA Section on
Litigation, the American College of Trial Lawyers, and the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York. These groups
induced the Senate Judiciary Committee to hold a hearing that I
attended on May 28, 1989. Former Attorney General Ben Civiletti,
then chair of the ABA Section, offered testimony in favor of
supersession. Professors Edward Cooper, Mary Kay Kane, and
Charles Alan Wright also submitted statements supporting
supersession. Professors Judith Resnik, representing the ACLU, and
Stephen Burbank submitted statements opposing supersession. The
Advisory Committee’s support for supersession prevailed in the
Senate, and the law as enacted in 1988 retained the supersession

89. It was possibly for this reason that Judge Johnson stepped down from the Advisory
Committee’s chair, so that it was Judge Weis who presided over the Advisory Committee’s first
public meetings.
90. For my contemporaneous account, see Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in Judicial
Rulemaking, 75 JUDICATURE 161 (1991).
91. H.R. REP. NO. 99-422, at 22–23 (1985).
92. H.R. 3550, 99th Cong., 131 Cong. Rec. 35,190–92 (1985).
93. For elaboration on the uses of the clause, see Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and
“Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 322–27.
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94

clause. I note, however, that the problem with supersession abides:
there is now a circuit split on the application of the clause to the
divergence between Section 3731 of Title 18 and Rule 4(b) of the
95
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Whether this recent conflict reflects
the possibility that our victorious lobbying was misguided I leave to
wiser heads better informed by twenty-five years of additional
experience.
The Advisory Committee thereafter devoted our attention to the
text of the Civil Rules, to the rules’ interpretation or
misinterpretation by courts, and to any available data from the
Administrative Office that might suggest how best to achieve the
Rule 1 aims of reducing needless cost, delay, and confusion. In that
spirit, and perhaps in response to the public debate over supersession
and transsubstantivity, the Advisory Committee amended Rule 1 to
urge pursuit of those aims in the case-managerial practices that had
begun to replace the traditional forms of litigation.
B. Issue 2: Belated Amendment to Correct the Identification
of a Defendant
A modest example of our committee work was Rule 15(c),
pertaining to the relation between pleading amendments and statutes
of limitations. The need to revise this rule came to the Advisory
Committee’s attention because of the 1986 decision of the Supreme
96
Court in Schiavone v. Fortune. The plaintiffs had sued alleging that
they were defamed in Fortune magazine. Belatedly, they learned that
there was no such corporate entity as Fortune. They then served the
summons and complaint on the corporate publisher, Time, Inc. The
Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations had run, barring
97
their claims. Given that Time had in fact been fully informed of the
filing of the claim long before the limitation period had run, this
seemed inconsistent with the purpose of Rule 15(c) allowing
amendments to “relate back” for the purposes of the statute. It also
98
seemed at odds with the aims expressed in Rule 1.
94. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 401, 102
Stat. 4642, 4648–49 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006)).
95. See Anthony Vitarelli, Comment, A Blueprint for Applying the Rules Enabling Act’s
Supersession Clause, 117 YALE L.J. 1225, 1225 (2008).
96. Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21 (1986).
97. Id. at 27.
98. Note the similarity of the Schiavone case to the Court’s more recent holdings that some
rules imposing time limits that it deems to be jurisdictional cannot be waived by a defendant—
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The Advisory Committee invested a lot of time in the task of
revising Rule 15(c), partly as a result of my shortcomings in drafting a
text that fully solved the problem. In the effort to clarify the rule, we
were striving to achieve simplicity; to that end, we tried to adhere to
the rule urged by Professor Rosenberg, which cautioned us to keep
the text simple by removing a word to make room for any word we
proposed to add. In due course we recommended an amendment that
was promulgated in 1991. Alas, our amendment was not so clear that
it resolved the recurring issues in later cases. Scores of reported
decisions have since interpreted our rule. Some of them may have
99
been wrong. Yet in 2010, the Court unanimously decided a case
closely resembling the Fortune case in conformity with the 1991
revision. It relied in part on the statement of legislative purpose set
100
forth in the Advisory Committee Notes to explain the text.
101
Curiously, Justice Scalia wrote a very brief concurring opinion to
express his disapproval of the reference to the explanatory committee
note that had been presented and presumably considered by the
Advisory Committee, the Standing Committee of the Judicial
Conference, the Conference, the Supreme Court, and both Houses of
Congress.
Similar explanatory notations are commonly found attached to
the recommendations of the American Law Institute or the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Their purpose is the same as
the formal Opinion of the Court—to advance the prospect of
common understanding and deter idiosyncratic interpretations by
judges who are expected to enforce law.
A few weeks after Justice Scalia’s curious concurrence, he
repeated his protest when the Court cited the Advisory Committee

even one who is fully informed and in no way prejudiced by a plaintiff’s mistaken
noncompliance. E.g., Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007). In Bowles, the Court enforced
the limit on the time for filing an appeal from a denial of habeas corpus. The petitioner missed
by one day but filed on the day that the defense and the trial court had agreed was the last day.
Id. at 2366–67. I question whether any member of Congress who voted for the law would have
approved that result. But see Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008)
(explaining the roles of jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional rules). I regard the issue as one ripe
for consideration by the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules.
99. Cf. Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 469–73 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding
that the relation-back rule is not limited to a mistake about the proper party’s identity).
100. Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2494–95 (2010).
101. Id. at 2498–99 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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102

Notes to one of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This time,
Justice Thomas joined.
These protests reveal that some of the Justices resist ideas
embedded in the Rules Enabling Act as impediments to the exercise
of discretion by the Justices in making procedural laws conforming to
their superior judgment. Among recent authors, Professor Benjamin
Spencer has best reminded us that the rule-amendment process is
preferable to judge-made law because it is a more democratic,
103
transparent, and accountable method of law reform, even if it may
impede the lawmaking ambition of the Justices.
C. Issue 3: Rule 48 and Trial by Jury
The Supreme Court has on several occasions chosen to disregard
the text of the Civil Rules, the advice of those engaged in the
rulemaking process, and even the text of the Constitution to conform
104
the Civil Rules to the preferences of a majority of the Justices. At
the time of my arrival as Reporter, there was ferment over what the
Supreme Court and the district judges had done to the right to a jury
in a civil case as assured by the Seventh Amendment. The Advisory
Committee was obliged at least to reconsider the text of Rule 49,
which had become misleading in light of then-recent developments
105
altering the size of the civil jury.
I was among the many who disapproved of the Supreme Court’s
decision confirming the discretion of district judges to impanel juries
106
of fewer than twelve. That decision validated local rules that were
not consistent with the text of Rule 49. Those local rules were not
connected to the politics of Rule 1 or to business interests’ resistance

102. Black v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2963, 2963–70 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
103. A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 454 (2008). The same
point was also made in reporting the Twombly decision in The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—
Leading Cases: Civil Procedure: Pleading Standards, 121 HARV. L. REV. 305, 313 (2007).
104. A major influence in moving the Court to think in this way was Justice Brennan, who
saw his office as one that would “shape a way of life for the American people.” DAVID E.
MARION, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN. JR., THE LAW AND
POLITICS OF “LIBERTARIAN DIGNITY” 161–62 (1997).
105. ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE 122 (1937), available at http://www.uscourts.gov
/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV04-1937.pdf (“Rule 49. Jurors of Less than Twelve.
– Majority Verdict. The parties may stipulate that the jury shall consist of any number less than
twelve or that a verdict or a finding or a stated majority of the jurors shall be taken as the
verdict of finding of the jury.”).
106. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 159–60 (1973).
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to private enforcement of public law, but did reflect a different divide,
of constitutional import, over the measure of discretion to be vested
in federal judges. It seemed that the Judicial Conference generally
favored judicial discretion. Others favored more explicit rules to
guide judges and lawyers and assure that the law was evenhandedly
enforced.
In the early 1970s at a Fourth Circuit judicial conference, I heard
Chief Justice Burger in an informal discussion with perhaps twenty
lawyers propose that the civil jury be eliminated to allow district
107
judges to decide cases more efficiently. The decision to allow judges
to reduce the civil jury to six was, for the Chief Justice, a halfway
measure, but it conformed to a recommendation of an ABA
108
committee. The idea of a six-person jury had been presented to
Congress in 1971, and again in 1973 and 1977, but Congress took no
109
positive action.
Given its disregard for the tradition and text of the Seventh
Amendment and the failure of the proposal to gain the acceptance of
Congress, the decision also implied that district judges were
practically free to exercise judicial power in the manner of English
110
chancellors and to disregard the text of Rule 49 by allowing a jury of
fewer than twelve by stipulation of the parties. That disregard of the
text was a source of concern to the Advisory Committee.
After perhaps improvidently expressing my own disapproval of
the Court’s decision at a conference at the University of Chicago
111
convened to discuss the topic, I put the issue of Rule 48 on the
Advisory Committee’s agenda. It was clear that the committee in
1990 would not reconsider the six-person jury, but it did agree to
make the text of the rule correspond to reality. A few years later,
after my time, the committee supported a return to the twelve-person
jury, but it was unable to gain the support of the Judicial
112
Conference.

107. See Warren E. Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary—1971, 57 A.B.A. J. 855, 858
(1971).
108. Report Number 1 of the Special Committee on Coordination of Judicial Improvements,
99 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 182, 305 (1974).
109. For an account of the efforts, see Resnik, supra note 61, at 141–43.
110. See Subrin, supra note 25, at 918–20 (explaining the role of chancellors).
111. Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 33, 51.
112. Leading the effort was Richard S. Arnold. See Richard S. Arnold, Trial by Jury: The
Constitutional Right to a Jury of Twelve in Civil Trials, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 27–35 (1993).
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IV. REFORMING THE DISCOVERY RULES:
MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
While we attended to such technical matters, the political pot of
deregulation or tort reform to protect business from unwelcome
private law enforcement continued to boil, and the Advisory
Committee was feeling its heat.
A. The Text of Rule 35
Congress again joined in (or intruded into) our enterprise in 1988
by quietly enacting as Section 7047 of its mammoth Anti-Drug Abuse
Act a revision of Rule 35 authorizing mental examinations of parties
113
by psychologists as well as psychiatrists. The Advisory Committee
had no objection to this amendment and followed the lead of
Congress, proposing in 1991 that Rule 35 be amended to enable
parties to secure examinations by other “suitably” qualified
professionals—the experts perhaps best suited to assess some
114
personal injuries. Some regretted that Congress had not referred
the issue to the Judicial Conference for its consideration.
B. Localization
In the same 1988 law, Congress also expressed concern over the
localization of federal law by the promulgation of diverse local rules
115
of procedure. Delocalization had been a raison d’etre of the 1938
Rules. Localization was seen to be a significant problem because it
introduced additional elements of complexity and uncertainty into the
116
national law governing proceedings in the federal courts. Some
districts’ elaborate local rules also threatened disharmony with the
secondary aim of the 1934 Act—to enable counsel to represent clients

113. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7047, 102 Stat. 4181, 4401
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 4247 (2006); FED. R. CIV. P. 35). Section 7047 extended the
role of psychologists in enforcing the drug laws; Congress also amended Rule 35 to
accommodate the role of psychologists.
114. FED. R. CIV. P. 35 advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment.
115. Id. For a current review of the problem of localization, see Samuel P. Jordan, Local
Rules and the Limits of Trans-Territorial Procedure, 52 WM. &. MARY L. REV. (forthcoming
Nov. 2010).
116. See Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 55–58 (1997);
Lauren Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN L. REV.
1447, 1449 (1994); Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts, 46
STAN. L. REV. 1589, 1589–92 (1994).
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in diverse federal courts without the need to study local practices.
117
Such unleashing of local rulemakers was seen as threatening chaos.
The most common kind of local rule invalidated by Congress was
a restriction on the number of interrogatories a party could serve
118
except by leave of court; almost every district had such a rule, and
after 1988 all of them were invalid. The Advisory Committee that I
served felt an obligation to respond both to the concern of Congress
119
about localization and the concerns expressed by local advisory
committees that were prone to constrain discovery practices.
C. Discovery Costs
The center of much political discourse then, as now, was the cost
and effectiveness of the discovery rules. No one doubted that many
lawyers were very thorough and sometimes abusive in conducting
discovery. An unextraordinary example brought to my attention was
an extended three-day deposition of a university president by a
lawyer advancing a claim for medical malpractice against the
university’s hospital. It seemed obvious by the second day of the
deposition, if not long before, that the deponent had no relevant
information, but the deposition continued. The apparent aim of the
extended deposition was to induce the president to agree to a
settlement in order to terminate his endless questioning. Such abuses
were equally obvious to many observers of big commercial cases
litigated by lawyers paid by the hour to conduct depositions in teams
of three or more.
D. The Task Force on Civil Justice: Justice for All
In 1987, in response to the political ferment over such costs, the
Brookings Institution appointed a Task Force on Civil Justice
Reform. This appeared to be a response to a proposal by Senator
Joseph Biden, who was at the time the chair of the Judiciary
Committee. He may even have suggested some or all of the thirty-five
members of the study group. They met several times at Brookings to

117. See Carrington, supra note 32, at 938–39. Localism abides, and some local rules are
nontranssubstantive. Marcus, supra note 88, at 427–29.
118. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE ON THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE U.S., REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT 95–99 (1988).
119. E.g., Robert E. Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and the Tension with Uniformity,
50 U. PITT. L. REV. 853, 860–62 (1989).
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debate the issues, received the results of a Lou Harris poll, and in
1989 published a report entitled Justice for All: Reducing Costs and
121
Delay in Civil Litigation. This title suggested fidelity to the aims of
the 1938 Civil Rules and the antecedent politics favoring effective
private law enforcement. It favored ideas then circulating among the
federal judiciary: differential case management, earlier judicial
engagement, encouragement of voluntary exchange of information,
early resolution of discovery disputes before the filing of motions, and
referral of appropriate cases to alternative dispute resolution
programs. Justice for All also advocated empirical studies by an
independent source in addition to those provided by the Federal
122
Judicial Center.
There was at the time of this publication a manifest shortage of
data to resolve conflicting observations bearing on the feasibility of its
proposals. Yet Justice for All provided the basis for Senator Biden’s
proposed legislation, enacted as the Civil Justice Reform Act of
123
124
1990. The Business Round Table and the American Institute of
125
Certified Public Accountants supported the Act, but some federal
judges regarded such action by the Senate as an affront to judicial
independence and opposed the measure. In their view, procedural
126
rules were solely the business of the Judicial Conference. The
Senate Committee Report, in the tradition of the 1938 Civil Rules,
explained that the Act was “to promote for all citizens—rich or poor,
120. LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCS., PROCEDURAL REFORM OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A
STUDY CONDUCTED FOR THE FOUNDATION FOR CHANGE, INC. (1989) (stating that many
federal judges, corporate counsel, and public interest litigators agreed that transaction costs are
problematic and can result in unequal justice).
121. BROOKINGS INST., JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL
LITIGATION (1989). Charles Alan Wright generously describes the report as “particularly
influential.” WRIGHT, supra note 26, at 436. Its influence was, however, preordained; causation
went from the Senate to Brookings, not from Brookings to the Senate.
122. Cf. Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field
Experiments, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 67–68 (Summer 1988) (explaining the need for
empirical studies and suggesting a methodology).
123. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. I, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (2006)).
124. Press Release, PR Newswire, Importance of Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 Stressed
by the Business Roundtable (Jan. 23, 1990) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). See generally
Jeffrey J. Peck, “Users United”: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 54 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 105, 107 (Summer 1991) (discussing the Civil Justice Reform Act’s substantive changes
and the process leading to the creation of the Act).
125. AICPA endorses Civil Justice Reform Act, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Apr. 1990, at 27, 27.
126. See Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L.
REV. 375, 407–35 (1992); Robel, supra note 116, at 1450.
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individual or corporation, plaintiff or defendant—the just, speedy and
inexpensive resolution of civil disputes in our Nation’s federal
127
courts.” It empowered district courts to experiment with diverse
forms of case management in response to the not-very-original ideas
128
set forth in Justice for All. The experimenting district courts were
required to appoint and consult local advisory committees of suitable
129
diversity. The statute called for an independent study of the results
130
over a seven-year period.
E. The Idea of Mandatory Disclosure
In 1989, at the direction of the Advisory Committee, I drafted for
its consideration a possible amendment to Rule 26 requiring parties
to make voluntary disclosures of relevant and discoverable
information. My draft was a radical proposal requiring disclosure of
just about everything an advocate might have that the other side
might want to know about a newly filed case. The basic idea of
mutual disclosure had been suggested by then-Magistrate Wayne
131
Brazil in 1978, and our draft adopted his idea.
Consistent with traditional practice, as well as with Congressman
Kastenmeier’s policy of transparency in rulemaking, we circulated
this preliminary draft to seek comment from diverse interested

127. S. REP. NO. 101-416, at 1 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6804.
128. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, § 102, 104 Stat. at 5089–90 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 471 note).
129. The act ordered each experimenting U.S. district court to implement a Civil Justice
Expense and Delay Reduction Plan under the direction of an advisory group comprising “those
who must live with the civil justice system on a regular basis.” S. REP. NO. 101-416, at 414,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6817 (quoting 136 CONG. REC. 589 (1990) (statement of Sen.
Biden, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary)).
130. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, § 103, 104 Stat. at 5096 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 471
note) (“The requirements set forth in sections 471 through 478 . . . shall remain in effect for
seven years after the date of the enactment of this title.”). There were criticisms of the Act. See,
e.g., A. Leo Levin, Beyond Techniques of Case Management: The Challenge of the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990, 67 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 877, 894 (1993) (“[I]t must be clear that this is hardly
the way to maintain uniformity in a national system of courts.”). Among the problems presented
was a difficulty in measuring its expiration. See Carl Tobias, The Expiration of the Civil Justice
Reform Act, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 541, 542–43 (2002) (noting that there were differing
interpretations of the Act’s expiration).
131. Brazil, Adversary Character, supra note 57, at 1348–57 (1978) (arguing that the duty to
voluntarily disclose information should not be limited to formal investigations, “but [should]
extend[] to all material data, regardless of how it is acquired”); see also William W Schwarzer,
The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 703, 721
(1989) (suggesting that discovery rules be altered to require “prompt disclosure of all material
documents”).

CARRINGTON IN FINAL.DOC

2010]

11/29/2010 6:56:44 PM

POLITICS AND CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES

627

scholars, judges, and lawyers. It was obvious to the Advisory
Committee when it met to consider my draft and the comments
received that our proposal needed work. Among its worrisome
features was a requirement that all expert reports be disclosed. The
Advisory Committee sensed that this went too far; such material
might be discoverable in due course, but the parties could not
properly be required to commit themselves to a line of expert
testimony before the issues of fact, if any, were clearly defined. Yet
for want of a better idea, some of the experimental districts
promulgated our draft as a local rule to be tested empirically.
The Advisory Committee sought to contain such rampant
localization of discovery practice. So, after further consideration, we
circulated a draft of the rule that would authorize local districts to
enact disclosure rules more prudently limited than the rule I had
improvidently circulated earlier. The Advisory Committee proposed
adding two full pages of text to Rule 26(a) prescribing what the
Advisory Committee deemed an appropriate duty of disclosure and
its limits; we stopped short in that draft of requiring counsel to
anticipate the allegations of the adversary. On receipt of this draft,
some districts promulgated it as their local rule, and some drew
132
criticism for doing so. But as a result, there were three and possibly
more versions of Rule 26 in different local districts.
F. The Council on Competitiveness
Meanwhile, as the local district advisory committees were doing
their work pursuant to the Civil Justice Reform Act, the political
premises of that law were being contested by a Republican
administration seeking reelection in 1992. The Republicans
positioned themselves as faithful to business interests beleaguered not
only by the high cost of litigation, but also by substantive concerns
over the application of tort law to deter disapproved business
practices. Vice President Dan Quayle was appointed to lead a
Council on Competitiveness staffed largely—if not entirely—by loyal
Republicans committed to protecting the ability of American business

132. See Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the
Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 813–21 (1991) (describing the observations of
attorneys in Florida following the adoption of the rule in their district).
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133

to compete profitably in global markets. Deregulation was their
often-stated aim.
In the same vein, and contemporaneous with the appointment of
the Council on Competitiveness, scholar and Circuit Judge Frank
Easterbrook protested that American business interests were being
threatened because trial judges were helpless to control parties
abusing the discovery process. Judge Easterbrook viewed the casemanagement powers conferred on district judges as inadequate to the
134
task. This assessment was no more rooted in data than was Justice
for All, but Judge Easterbrook expressed no need for information
about the facts on the ground.
The Quayle Council on Competitiveness conducted hearings,
and in 1990 I was summoned to a Council hearing in the Department
of Justice to explain the ongoing consideration of the discovery rules
and the reasons, if any, for not repealing Rules 26 through 37. It is fair
to say that my words were without effect. In 1991, the Council
135
published its Agenda for Civil Justice Reform, recommending many
changes in the civil justice system, including reversing the
136
longstanding American Rule and introducing the principle that the

133. See DAVID S. BRODER & BOB WOODWARD, THE MAN WHO WOULD BE PRESIDENT:
DAN QUAYLE 125–28 (1992) (“[Quayle] made his chairmanship . . . a command post for a war
against government regulation of American business.”); Warren T. Brookes, The President’s
Council on Competitiveness, NATION’S BUS., May 1989, at 32, 32 (noting that Vice President
Quayle was the perfect candidate to run “this potentially pathfinding effort”). The House of
Representatives denied funding to the Council. Kenneth J. Cooper, Divided House Bars Funds
for Quayle Competitiveness Council, WASH. POST, July 2, 1992, at A6; see also Jonathan H.
Adler, Quayle’s Hush-Hushed Council, NAT’L REV., Nov. 2, 1992, at 28, 28 (“Democrats called
the vote an act of good government while Republicans denounced it as campaign-year
politics.”).
134. Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638–39 (1989)
(emphasizing that judges have little control over the discovery process because the parties
“control the legal claims to be presented and conduct the discovery themselves”). Contrast the
speculative view of Judge William Schwarzer, see Schwarzer, supra note 131, at 707, and the
contrary opinion expressed by Judge Richard Posner in American Nurses Ass’n v. Illinois, 783
F.2d 716, 723–27 (7th Cir. 1986) (observing that the Council’s main goal was to reduce
regulation).
135. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
IN AMERICA (1991).
136. The American Rule was expressed in Act of Feb. 26, 1853 (Fees Act), ch. 80, §§ 1, 3, 10
Stat. 161, 161–69. The Act expressed the holding of the Court in Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 306 (1796), that counsel’s fees were not properly included in damages. Id. at 306; see also
John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 9 (Winter 1984) (explaining that the recoverable amount of attorney fees
is determined by the legislature); John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation:
The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1571 (1993) (noting that the
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loser must pay the full costs of the winner of a lawsuit. The Council
did not advance my suggestion to reduce discovery costs by
forbidding hourly billing by lawyers engaged in discovery to eliminate
the incentive for wasteful practices.
Vice President Quayle was an outspoken champion of the
137
Council’s Agenda, and though he was not alone in voicing that
138
view, his explanatory remarks to a meeting of the ABA were not
139
Indeed, in a blistering denunciation, Talbot
well received.
D’Alemberte, the President of the ABA, accused Vice President
140
Quayle of using discredited statistics to advance ill-founded views.
As Judge Learned Hand had observed long before, rhetoric

American Rule “reflects simple adherence to legislative commands”); see also William W
Schwarzer, Fee-Shifting Offers of Judgment—An Approach to Reducing the Cost of Litigation,
76 JUDICATURE 147, 148 (1992) (arguing that a loser-pays rule in the U.S. would deter some
litigation because of the risk of having to pay the winner’s fees if unsuccessful).
137. See Dan Quayle, Too Much Litigation: True Last Year, True Now, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 10,
1992, at 17 (“Our recommendations . . . will result in swifter, and less costly, justice.”); Dan
Quayle, Vice President of the U.S., Remarks to the American Business Conference, in FED.
NEWS SERV., Oct. 1, 1991 (“Despite the obvious—that there are social and economic costs when
litigation is overused or abused—some lawyers with an interest in preserving the status quo
have maintained that there really are no problems in our legal system.”).
138. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES 4 (1988) (suggesting that the increase in tort litigation “costs American
individuals, businesses, municipalities, and other government bodies at least $80 billion a year”
in the form of a tort tax); Jack Anderson, U.S. Has Become Nation of Lawsuits, WASH. POST,
Jan. 25, 1985, at B8 (“No case is too distant, no client too remote to daunt America’s tenacious
lawyers—if the fee is right.”); George [H.W.] Bush, President of the U.S., Remarks at a Labor
Day Picnic, in FED. NEWS SERV., Sept. 7, 1992 (advocating for reform in the civil justice system
to decrease the amount America spends on lawsuits); Robert F. Dee, Blood Bath, ENTERPRISE,
Mar.–Apr. 1986, at 3 (“Like a plague of locusts, U.S. lawyers with their clients have descended
on America and are suing the country out of business. Literally.”).
139. David Margolick, Address by Quayle on Justice Proposals Irks Bar Association, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 14, 1991, at A1. For his account of his presentation, see DAN QUAYLE, STANDING
FIRM: A VICE-PRESIDENTIAL MEMOIR 282–90 (1994).
140. Randall Samborn & Rorie Sherman, Quayle Spices Up ABA Meeting, NAT’L L.J., Feb.
17, 1992, at 1. Among the studies that the vice president appeared not to have consulted were
PAUL R. CONNOLLY, EDITH A. HOLLEMAN & MICHAEL J. KUHLMAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY (1978), and
EBERSOLE & BURKE, supra note 57. Related research, which the vice president may not have
consulted, includes PROJECT FOR EFFECTIVE JUSTICE, FIELD SURVEY OF FEDERAL PRETRIAL
DISCOVERY: REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1965);
MAURICE ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE: A
CONTROLLED TEST IN PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION (1964); DANIEL SEGAL, FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE ON DISCOVERY FROM 1970 TO THE PRESENT: EXPRESSED
DISSATISFACTIONS AND PROPOSED REFORMS (1978); Maurice Rosenberg, Professor of Law,
Colum. L. Sch., Changes Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery, (Mar. 23, 1968), in 45 F.R.D. 479
(1969).
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forecasting doom, such as the Vice President’s, has been heard since
141
the time of Hammurabi. Professor Marc Galanter soon offered
empirical evidence that the “litigation explosion” to which the
142
Council on Competitiveness purported to respond did not exist;
there was no contrary study produced to question his conclusion.
In due course, the Council on Competitiveness made some
recommendations that resembled those advanced by the Brookings
143
group. One notable recommendation that may have deserved more
attention than it received aimed to constrain overuse of expert
144
testimony. Professor Deborah R. Hensler assessed the council’s
broader proposals as going well beyond procedural reform; “[they]
seek to change the current balance between individual plaintiffs and
corporate defendants, in favor of the latter. That agenda,” she
observed, “is a political one, and it ought be debated and decided on
145
the floors of Congress and state legislatures.” No one contended
otherwise, but few debates, if any, were held.
G. Empirical Evaluation of Mandatory Disclosure
146

While the Council on Competitiveness was having its day, the
Advisory Committee was receiving early reports of the ongoing

141. See supra note 52.
142. Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENV. U.
L. REV. 77, 83–90 (1993).
143. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 135 (recommending fifty
specific reforms designed to improve efficiency in litigation). Its recommendations were
embodied in the Access to Justice Act, S. 2180, 102d Cong. (1992); see also Exec. Order No.
12,778, 3 C.F.R. 359 (1992). See generally Dan Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV.
559 (1992) (highlighting proposals for civil justice reform). For an account of the recent
developments in civil justice reform, see Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform Roadmap, 142 F.R.D.
507, 509–11 (1992); Carl Tobias, Executive Branch Civil Justice Reform, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1521,
1552–58 (1993).
144. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 135, at 21–22 (suggesting a
reform of the rules controlling expert witnesses).
145. Deborah R. Hensler, Taking Aim at the American Legal System: The Council on
Competitiveness’s Agenda for Legal Reform, 75 JUDICATURE 244, 250 (1992); see also Carl
Tobias, Silver Linings in Federal Civil Justice Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 857, 858–60 (1993)
(acknowledging the benefits of the Civil Justice Reform Program); Weinstein, supra note 54, at
833–34 (arguing that procedural civil justice reforms are having a substantive effect without
being framed as substantive reforms).
146. A nongovernmental organization of “CEOs, university presidents and labor leaders”
took the same name in 2002. About Us—Compete.org, COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, http://
www.compete.org/about-us (last visited Sept. 27, 2010). For a scorching assessment of the
Quayle Council’s handiwork, see Undoing Quayle Council Damage, OMB WATCH (July 3,
2002), http://www.ombwatch.org/node/740.

CARRINGTON IN FINAL.DOC

2010]

11/29/2010 6:56:44 PM

POLITICS AND CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES

631

empirical studies envisioned by the Brookings group and conducted
147
148
by RAND and the Federal Judicial Center. The early data
indicated that the disclosure requirements established in some district
courts were achieving modest savings in the cost of litigation.
Although the seven-year period of experimentation specified by the
1990 Act had five years yet to run, the Advisory Committee decided
in 1992 to recommend the promulgation of our improved draft of
Rule 26, lending support to the local rules requiring limited
disclosures to adversaries before any requests.
H. Other Limitations: Rules 16, 30, and 33
While it was reconsidering Rule 26, the Advisory Committee
149
also agreed to limit the number and length of depositions and the
150
number of written interrogatories that a party might impose on an
adversary without leave of court. The Advisory Committee proposed
revisions of Rules 30 and 33 for those purposes; we also proposed
151
revisions of other discovery rules to fit them to the 1992 package.
And we proposed to amend Rule 16 to permit and encourage greater
use of pretrial meetings to plan discovery and trial. The Advisory
Committee modestly expected these amendments to serve the stated
aims of both the competing Quayle and Biden groups, and empirical
152
evidence suggests that at least some did.
These modest reforms were not expected to resolve all the
disarray, but at least some of us thought that they might help to calm
the storm of the Council on Competitiveness. We also thought they
would ease the concern about the proliferation of localization
threatening the national uniformity that had been the first object of
the 1934 law and the reason that many states had signed on to the

147. James S. Kakalik, Terence Dunworth, Laural A. Hill, Daniel McCaffrey, Marian
Oshiro, Nicholas M. Pace & Mary E. Vaiana, Just, Speedy and Inexpensive? An Evaluation of
Judicial Case Management Under the Civil Justice Reform Act, 49 ALA. L. REV. 17, 17–19 (1997).
For a study of this report, see Bryant G. Garth, Observations on an Uncomfortable Relationship:
Civil Procedure and Empirical Research, 49 ALA. L. REV. 103 (1997).
148. DONNA STIENSTRA, MOLLY JOHNSON & PATRICIA LOMBARD, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE
MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF THE FIVE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED UNDER
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990, at 1 (1997).
149. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2); id. 30(d)(1).
150. Id. 33(a)(1).
151. Id. 37.
152. Kakalik et al., supra note 147, at 45–46.
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153

Civil Rules in haec verba. The Standing Committee approved our
efforts. The Judicial Conference approved. And the Supreme Court
154
promulgated our proposed amendments.
I.

My Personal Immortality

But that was not quite the end of the story on mandatory
disclosures in my time as Reporter. Several months after the Court
promulgated our proposed rule, the leadership of the ABA suddenly
155
became incensed at the idea of mandatory disclosure, and President
156
157
Bush expressed his disapproval. So did Justice Scalia. The very
idea was said to be an offense against the sacred adversary tradition.
To make any voluntary disclosure to an adversary was seen as a
betrayal of the client. The House Judiciary Committee unanimously
158
recommended that Congress veto the amendment to Rule 26. And
the House of Representatives did just that; it overwhelmingly
disapproved of our rule as promulgated by the Court and rejected it
159
in a voice vote.
But under the Rules Enabling Act, the veto required majority
votes of disapproval in both houses. The proposed reform therefore
went to the Senate, where the ABA lobbyists had clearly doomed it.
But the Senate Judiciary Committee had to disapprove of the rule
before sending it to the full Senate—at a time when the committee
was on a calendar requiring short meetings with limited debate and

153. See generally Oakley & Coon, supra note 35 (classifying certain states as replicators of
the federal rules).
154. Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401 (1993).
155. See Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)—
“Much Ado About Nothing?,” 46 HASTINGS L.J. 679, 729 (1995) (suggesting that the profession
“unleash[ed] a flood of criticism on the disclosure proposal”). There were over three hundred
written submissions received from individual practitioners, law firms, scholars, bar associations,
plaintiffs’ and defense trial lawyer associations, insurers, public interest groups, federal district
judges, and industry. Of them, all but approximately a dozen opposed the new rule. Griffin B.
Bell, Chilton Davis Varner & Hugh Q. Gottschalk, Automatic Disclosure in Discovery—The
Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 28 (1992).
156. Exec. Order No. 12,778, 3 C.F.R. 359 (1992).
157. Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 507, 510–12 (1983)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
158. Alfred W. Cortese Jr. & Kathleen L. Blaner, A Change in the Rules Draws Fire:
Litigators Fight to Stop Mandatory Disclosure, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 18, 1993, at 25; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 2074(a) (2006) (establishing the process for submitting rules to Congress).
159. 139 CONG. REC. 27,271–74 (1993); see also Paul D. Carrington, Learning from the Rule
26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need Real Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295, 309 (1994). Though the totals from
the voice vote are not recorded, I recall this vote as being unanimous against the rule.
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unanimity to send a proposal to the full Senate. The Subcommittee on
Courts and Administrative Practice conducted a brief hearing, at
160
which Judge Pointer was allowed five minutes. Unanimity was
denied when Senator Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio raised his hand
to insist on a full hearing in the Judiciary Committee on the issues
161
presented. But there could be no hearing within the time allowed by
the Rules Enabling Act for the congressional veto. So the rule I had
the pleasure of drafting became the law of the United States
notwithstanding its overwhelming disapproval by the House of
Representatives and its almost certain disapproval by the Senate. I do
not expect that anyone will ever equal my achievement in writing a
law that a unanimous (as I recall the voice vote) house of Congress
could not prevent from becoming the law of the United States. And
162
“my” rule abides. Perhaps the event demonstrates the frailties of
democratic civil rulemaking.
J.

The Continuing Dispute over Disclosure Requirements

Indeed, it may now be concluded that the adversary tradition
has, for the moment, survived and that the disclosures required by
Rule 26 may have reduced costs in some cases. But the disclosures
163
have been no magic bullet and have drawn some criticism of their

160. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 2–5
(1993). This hearing occurred prior to the House vote.
161. Shilpa Shah, Note, An Application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1) to
Section 1983 Actions: Does Rule 26(a)(1) Violate the Rules Enabling Act?, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
115, 120 (1995) (citing Randall Samborn, New Discovery Rules Take Effect, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 6,
1993, at 3).
162. Several authors offered contemporaneous comment. See Virginia E. Hench, Mandatory
Disclosure and Equal Access to Justice: The 1993 Federal Discovery Rules Amendments and the
Just, Speedy and Inexpensive Determination of Every Action, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 179, 207 (1994)
(suggesting that a different approach to pretrial procedure is needed “to avoid endless rounds of
‘satellite proceedings,’ and the constant potential for attorney-client conflict” (footnote
omitted)); Robert E. Oliphant, Four Years of Experience with Rule 26(a)(1): The Rule is Alive
and Well, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 323, 341–44 (1998) (reviewing the implementation of Rule
26(a)(1)); Bedora A. Sheronick, Note, Rock, Scissors, Paper: The Federal Rule 26(a)(1)
“Gamble” in Iowa, 80 IOWA L. REV. 363, 366 (1995) (arguing that the amended Rule 26 may be
one of modern civil procedure’s “most significant innovations” (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, 500 (1947))). See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive
Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 1393 (1994).
163. TERENCE DUNWORTH & JAMES S. KAKALIK, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE,
EVALUATING THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 (1995), http://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_briefs/RB9022 (“Overall, implicit policy changes may be as important as explicit ones.
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164

own. And the movement led in 1992 by Vice President Quayle for
deregulation or tort reform abides in the expressions of politicians
and other leaders who share a lack of interest in real data of the sort
165
assembled by RAND or the Federal Judicial Center. So, agitation
166
for reform of the discovery rules continues. Reforms of discovery
imposed since the enactment of the Civil Justice Reform Act have
done little to abate that political movement that wishes to reduce the
legal expenses of businesses and the effectiveness of private
enforcement of laws that they would prefer not to obey. With their
objective in mind, I have elsewhere suggested that the fee-shifting
scheme advocated by the Quayle Commission be adopted but applied
only to discovery motions, in which context it might serve to deter
needless squabbling over the limits of the right to conduct private
167
investigations of claims and defenses. That proposal has not been

Many judges and lawyers have commented in interviews that the process of implementing the
pilot plans has raised the consciousness of judicial officers, clerks, and lawyers, with resulting
subtle changes in how things are done—perhaps fewer continuances, more attention to the cost
of discovery, more effort to settle cases.”); JAMES S. KAKALIK, TERENCE DUNWORTH, LAURAL
A. HILL, DANIEL MCCAFFREY, MARIAN OSHIRO, NICHOLAS M. PACE & MARY E. VAIANA,
RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 61–65 (1996); WILLIAM W SCHWARZER, LYNN H. PASAHOW
& JAMES B. LEWIS, CIVIL DISCOVERY AND MANDATORY DISCLOSURE: A GUIDE TO
EFFICIENT PRACTICE 6 (2d ed. 1994) (“The objections to [the disclosure] amendments
expressed before they went into effect appear to have proved unfounded by the experience
under them . . . .”); Edward D. Cavanagh, The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990: Requiescat in
Pace, 173 F.R.D. 565, 569 (1997) (“All in all, the CJRA was an unfortunate rush to judgment on
the problems afflicting the federal judicial system and how to solve them.”); Steven Flanders,
The Unanswered Question: Research on the Effects of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 Tells
Little About How to Mitigate Excessive Cost or Delay, 82 JUDICATURE 55 (1998); Elizabeth
Plapinger, Rand Study of Civil Justice Reform Act Sparks Debate, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 24, 1997, at
B18 (“Most controversial . . . are the report’s findings or lack of findings on ADR’s impact on
cost and delay.”).
164. Bell et al., supra note 155, at 2 (“The criticism of the civil justice system has reached a
crescendo in recent years.”); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reforming the New
Discovery Rules, 84 GEO. L.J. 61, 82–88 (1995) (arguing that the mandatory disclosure rule is
unlikely to have an effect on discovery costs).
165. For an apt account, see Miller, supra note 43.
166. Paul V. Niemeyer, Here We Go Again: Are the Federal Discovery Rules Really in Need
of Amendment?, 39 B.C. L. REV. 517, 520–21 (1998) (explaining the reexamination of the
discovery rules to determine whether full disclosure is too expensive and if any changes could be
made to make the system more efficient); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Ulysses Tied to the Generic
Whipping Post: The Continuing Odyssey of Discovery “Reform,” 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
197, 225–28 (Spring–Summer 2001) (“Additional study, experimentation, and reflection can be
tolerated by the court system and may prove beneficial in the long run.”).
167. See Carrington, supra note 116, at 66 (suggesting the use of fee shifting when parties
engage in discovery litigation).
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adopted—nor even, so far as I can tell, advanced by any business
interests.
V. RULE 4 AND SERVICE OF PROCESS ABROAD
A. Formalities of Service
168

Congress tinkered with Rule 4 in 1983, facilitating service of
summons by eliminating the traditional need to employ a U.S.
Marshal and by adopting a provision shifting the costs of service to a
defendant who refused to waive the needless and costly formality of
personal service. State courts had previously adopted both schemes,
169
and they seemed to be useful methods of reducing legal costs. The
Act was a reminder that Congress is and should be ultimately in
charge of making our national law.
But in that enactment, Congress seemingly neglected to provide
that the device of requested waiver of formal service of process could
be employed when the defendant to be served was outside the state in
170
which the court was sitting. The Advisory Committee perceived a
need to correct that apparent oversight and also to amend Rule 4 to
reduce a hazard imposed on parties suing the United States or its
officers. That hazard arose when a court of appeals held that a party
serving a summons on fewer than all of many necessary parties to
such an action within the time allowed could not be given additional
171
time to correct the oversight. The Advisory Committee felt that this
was a needless trap. Maybe, we then thought, one summons served on
the United States should suffice. I recall suggesting that each post
office should have a “P.O. Box A: Sue the U.S.” located next to P.O.
Box 1, where a summons might be served. But we were assured by
Attorney General Dick Thornburgh that the government absolutely
168. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-462, § 2, 96
Stat. 2527, 2527 (codified at 28 U.S.C. app. (2006)).
169. See 1 ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 5-26 to 5-33 (2d ed. 1991)
(discussing the process provided in the Civil Rules for service by mail and similar approaches
adopted by the states).
170. Robert A. Lusardi, Nationwide Service of Process: Due Process Limitations on the
Power of the Sovereign, 33 VILL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1988) (claiming that Congress has the power to
provide for service of process anywhere in the United States even though “it had not exercised
[that power] statutorily”).
171. E.g., Whale v. United States, 792 F.2d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 1986) (refusing to overturn the
district court’s denial of appellant’s Rule 60(b) motion because the appellant’s counsel’s failure
to personally serve the U.S. attorney was due to counsel’s own misreading of the rules and
therefore not justifiable).
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required multiple notices of any suit filed against it or its officers. We
did nevertheless manage some easing of suits against the government
by adding Rule 4(i)(4) to extend the time for correcting a defect in
service of process on the United States.
B. The Hague Convention and Formalities of Service Abroad
The Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague
Convention) posed a greater challenge to the Advisory Committee’s
172
173
work on Rule 4. It had been signed in 1965; by 1985 it had been
174
ratified by the United States and many other nations. Rule 4 needed
to be amended to accommodate the aim of that Hague Convention to
facilitate transnational litigation and to address the issues presented
by service of process outside the United States. Among its
complexities, the Hague Convention obligated signatory nations to
establish a “Central Authority” that would assume responsibility for
delivery of the requisite documents to defendants—a role not unlike
that of the U.S. Marshals until Congress relieved them of it in 1983.
(And a role that bears some resemblance to the idea of “P.O. Box A:
Sue U.S.”!)
As the Advisory Committee considered transnational service of
process, it also noted that the long arm of the federal courts in claims
arising under federal law against defendants served outside the
United States was not as long as recent due process decisions of the
175
Supreme Court suggested that it might be. Indeed, the Court had
explicitly invited rulemakers to consider whether the federal arm
should be extended to secure less-expensive and more-effective

172. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters, opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163
(entered into force Feb. 10, 1969).
173. On the role of the United States in its drafting and promotion, see generally Philip W.
Amram, The Proposed International Convention on the Service of Documents Abroad, 51
A.B.A. J. 650 (1965); Stephen F. Downs, Note, The Effect of the Hague Convention on Service
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 125 (1969).
174. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES ch.7.A, intro. note (1986) (“As of 1987, 25 states were parties to the Hague Service
Convention . . . .”).
175. E.g., Arrowsmith v. United Press Int’l, 320 F.2d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 1963) (“There thus
exists an overwhelming consensus that the amenability of a foreign corporation to suit in a
federal court in a diversity action is determined in accordance with the law of the state where
the court sits . . . .”).
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enforcement of our national law against foreign firms whose practices
176
risked harms to our citizens. The Advisory Committee resolved that
a federal plaintiff should be allowed to invoke personal jurisdiction
over a defendant having “minimum contacts” with the United States,
even though the contacts with any particular state might be too
modest to reach the minimum standard to sustain personal
jurisdiction in any state court. With these numerous thoughts in mind,
the Advisory Committee proceeded with its reconsideration of Rule
177
4.
With Congress’s cost-saving device in mind, the Advisory
Committee was attracted to the prospect of avoiding the costly
intricacies of compliance with the Hague Convention by asking the
defendant to waive the Central Authority procedure in a case in
which that procedure was not needed to provide the requisite
information to the defendant. The cost savings could be much more
significant in international than in domestic cases, given that service
of process through a Central Authority requires that the complaint
and summons be translated into the language of its officers—even if
the foreign defendant to be served is entirely fluent in English—and
is also likely to result in substantial delay, sometimes intentionally
imposed by governments protective of defendants in their territories.
Many international firms doing business in the United States have no
178
practical need for the Hague Convention’s formalities. Toyota does
not need to see a complaint against it in Japanese. The Advisory
Committee discussed the proposal with officers of the Department of
Justice and at informal academic gatherings in Europe. We could see
no reasonable objection for not applying the requested waiver-ofservice provision to defendants outside the United States, especially
when a costly, dilatory, and unnecessary translation would be needed.
The Advisory Committee therefore reorganized Rule 4 to
address all these purposes, published our draft for comment, and

176. Omni Capital Int’l v. Rudolph Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 109–10 (1987); see also J.
Dickson Phillips & Paul D. Carrington, Reflections on the Interface of Treaties and Rules of
Procedure: Time for Federal Long-Arm Legislation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 154
(Summer 1994) (calling for Congress to pass federal long-arm legislation).
177. See generally Joseph F. Weis, Jr., The Federal Rules and the Hague Conventions:
Concerns of Conformity and Comity, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 903 (1989) (tracing the development of
Rule 4 after the Hague Conventions).
178. E.g., Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 889 F.2d 172, 173–74 (8th Cir. 1989) (permitting
the plaintiff to serve the defendant based on the procedure in Article 10 rather than through the
Central Authority as outlined in Articles 2 and 6).
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heard no objections. The Standing Committee and the Judicial
Conference then unanimously approved the proposal.
C. Revision by the Court at the Suggestion of the British Embassy
But our proposal was quietly revised by our committee chair,
Judge Pointer, at the behest of the Supreme Court, to insert language
making the cost-shifting waiver-of-service provision inapplicable to a
179
defendant to be served outside the United States. Chief Justice
Rehnquist and the Judicial Conference directed the revision in
response to the protest of the British Embassy. The embassy,
presumably at the request of officials of the European Union, had
retained Erwin Griswold, a former solicitor general of the United
States, to inform the Court and the State Department that our
proposal was offensive to signatories to the Hague Convention. No
public consideration of this issue was ever conducted. So much for the
new practice of transparency required by the revised Rules Enabling
Act! It seemed to me at the time that the international political
question raised by the British Embassy was one best resolved by
Congress on the advice of the executive.
Just as the House of Representatives responded to the lobbying
of the ABA on Rule 26 without serious consideration of the political
issue it addressed, the Court and the Judicial Conference under the
leadership of Chief Justice Rehnquist responded to lobbying by the
British Embassy on Rule 4 without public deliberation or
consideration of the merits of the issue presented. I continue to
believe that the cost-shifting provision should be applied to a foreign
defendant who needlessly requires an American plaintiff to procure a
translation of a summons and complaint when the defendant is fully
fluent in English and is engaged in activities in the United States that
give rise to the complaint. I see no conflict with the Hague
Convention, whose aims are essentially those of Rule 1. I urge the
180
Advisory Committee to try once more to get it right.

179. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Reluctant Partner: Making Procedural Law for
International Civil Litigation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 143–48 (Summer 1994)
(describing how U.S. rulemakers have gone about changing Civil Rules that affect international
litigation).
180. See Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Service by Mail—Is the Stamp of Approval from the Hague
Convention Always Enough?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 177 (Summer 1994) (arguing
that the Civil Rules should focus on the process of service providing notice for international
defendants rather than on formalities). But see Doug Rendleman, Comment on Judge Joseph F.
Weis, Jr., Service by Mail—Is the Stamp of Approval from the Hague Convention Always
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VI. THE HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION
A. The Aérospatiale Case
The usual discovery rules were also applicable to international
litigation. The Advisory Committee was therefore obliged to consider
the Hague Evidence Convention bearing on the taking of evidence
181
abroad. The relation of that treaty to Rule 26 emerged as a problem
in 1987 in the 5–4 division of the Supreme Court in Société Nationale
182
Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States District Court. In that case,
the French manufacturers of an allegedly defective airplane resisted a
Rule 34 request for documents bearing on the airplane’s design by
insisting that the plaintiffs use the formalities provided by the
Convention. The Convention does impose on the signing nations an
obligation to cooperate with letters of request addressed not to the
party from whom evidence is sought but rather to its government,
with the expectation that the government will in due course secure
and transmit the evidence. The Court unanimously rejected the
defendants’ contention that the plaintiffs seeking documents located
in France were required to pursue them by means of the Letter of
Request procedure. The majority cautioned district courts to
“exercise special vigilance to protect foreign litigants from . . . unduly
183
burdensome . . . discovery,” but left the Convention available as an
184
alternate optional means of pursuing information or evidence.
Four Justices dissented from “[t]he Court’s view of this country’s
185
international obligations.” They urged that some deference be
shown to foreign sovereignty and the international agreement, and
that the Letter of Request procedure therefore be used as a first
resort when it is available and adequate to the specific task.

Enough?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 181 (Summer 1994) (arguing that the Civil Rules
should respect the sovereignty of other nations and their rules of procedure).
181. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters,
opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 (entered into force Oct. 7,
1972). See generally Lawrence Collins, The Hague Evidence Convention and Discovery: A
Serious Understanding?, 35 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 765 (1986) (arguing that the Hague Convention
has been misconceived by U.S. courts and that the Convention applies to evidence at trial but
not to rules of discovery).
182. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
183. Id. at 546.
184. Id. at 544.
185. Id. at 548 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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B. An Effort to Accommodate the Court’s Opinion and the
Convention in Rule 26
The issue presented by the two opinions seemed to the Advisory
Committee to be worthy of broader public consideration. We
published a draft of an amendment that would require a first resort to
the Letter of Request procedure if available and suited to the task at
186
hand. After considering the reactions to that tentative draft, the
Advisory Committee decided instead to express the opinion of the
Court in the text of the rule, including a reference to the Letter of
Request procedure as an option. The Advisory Committee’s purpose
was, as with the Rule 38 proposal, to assure, if possible, that the Civil
Rules as published accurately expressed the governing law.
After the Advisory Committee sent this proposal to the Court,
the United Kingdom voiced an objection, and the Court remanded
the matter to the Advisory Committee. When the Advisory
Committee, upon reconsideration, again resolved that the rule should
be amended to conform to the rule expressed by the Court, the
Department of State joined in expressing disapproval, so the Judicial
187
Conference laid the matter to rest. The majority opinion remains
the law, and there is still no reference to the Hague Evidence
188
Convention in the Civil Rules. It seems unlikely that many
American litigants have been constrained from discovery by courts
concerned about the need to exhibit respect for foreign
189
governments.
VII. RULE 11 SANCTIONS
The Advisory Committee’s first substantial response to business
interests’ rising complaints concerning frivolous claims and excessive
discovery had come in the 1983 amendments to Rule 11. As
previously noted, those amendments served to permit and encourage

186. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 127 F.R.D. 237, 318 (1989) (proposing a
method of requesting information during litigation involving international parties).
187. Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 515 (1993).
188. For a contemporaneous assessment of the results, see generally Gary B. Born, The
Hague Evidence Convention Revisited: Reflections on Its Role in U.S. Civil Procedure, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 77 (Summer 1994).
189. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS 198–204 (2008) (discussing how American courts often feel unrestrained by foreign
rules of discovery).
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the imposition of monetary sanctions on lawyers responsible for
190
asserting meritless motions, claims, and defenses. The revision was
well drafted and—though not entirely free of controversy—won much
approval at the time of its promulgation. Like many others, I thought
they had it about right. It did apparently have the effect of causing
some lawyers to do a bit more homework before filing a claim or
191
motion in federal court.
A. Abuses of Rule 11
Yet, although many lawyers told the American Judicature
Society that they had counseled a client not to file suit in light of Rule
192
11, the impact on actual filings was not evident.
And the
increasingly frequent resort to Rule 11 begot a substantial and
adverse reaction from members of the bar. The issues Rule 11
presented remained at the top of the Advisory Committee’s agenda
for at least four years. Among the complaints were that the newly
revised rule (1) gave rise to a new industry of Rule 11 motion practice
adding to cost and delay; (2) stimulated incivility between lawyers; (3)
was usually aimed at plaintiff’s counsel, leaving defense counsel
unrestrained in the assertion of unfounded denials; and (4)
encouraged judges to indulge their occasional personal animus
toward individual lawyers, sometimes by belated sua sponte rulings
193
coming after a dispute seemed to have been resolved. Another

190. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165, 167–68 (1983).
191. See generally AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE
REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, at
68–72 (Stephen B. Burbank ed., 1989) (discussing the impact of the changes to Rule 11 on civil
rights plaintiffs); N.Y. STATE BAR COMM. ON FED. COURTS, SANCTIONS & ATTORNEYS’ FEES
12 (1987); THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS
158–59 (1988) (describing how changes to Rule 11 had impacted lawyers’ approach to pleadings
and motions).
192. See generally ELIZABETH C. WIGGINS, THOMAS WILLGING & DONNA STIENSTRA, FJC
RULE 11: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1991) (providing an overview of the application of Rule
11 in federal courts).
193. See Paul D. Carrington & Andrew Wasson, A Reflection on Rulemaking: The Rule 11
Experience, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 563, 566 (2004); Herbert Kritzer, Lawrence Marshall &
Frances K. Zemans, Rule 11: Moving Beyond the Cosmic Anecdote, 75 JUDICATURE 259, 269
(1992); William W Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1013 (1988); Gerald
Solovy & Laura A. Kaster, Rule 11: Framework for Debate, 61 MISS. L.J. 1, 1 (1991).
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complaint heard was that the rule was deterring private enforcement
194
of public law, at least in the field of antitrust law.
A Third Circuit task force, organized by the American
Judicature Society and served by Professor Stephen Burbank, voiced
195
many of these concerns. Perhaps in part because of Congressman
Kastenmeier’s recent revisions to the Rules Enabling Act, the
Advisory Committee sought public comments on the efficacy of Rule
196
11, with ten specific questions posed for response. The Advisory
Committee also, perhaps for the first time, specifically requested that
the Administrative Office gather data on the effects of the Rule. No
fewer than three books were published by eminent authors reporting
197
the emerging case law to the lawyers caught in Rule 11’s toils.
Numerous hearings in diverse locations were conducted to hear the
views of lawyers and judges who had used the Rule. Their responses
were not reassuring. Not only were hostility levels elevated, but
lawyers were routinely asking judges to consider sanctions to punish
198
many, and perhaps most, lawyers whose motions they had denied.
Lawyers were making Rule 11 motions to sanction Rule 11 motions.
And there was reason to believe that sanctions were imposed
199
disproportionately on civil rights plaintiffs.

194. Daniel E. Lazaroff, Rule 11 and Federal Antitrust Litigation, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1034, 1039
(1993).
195. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11: An Update, 19 SETON HALL L. REV. 511 (1989) (providing a
summary of the task force’s work); Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil
Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925 (1989) (casting the amendment to
Rule 11 as part of an effort to bring uniformity and predictability to the enforcement of the Civil
Rules and to help cases be adjudicated on the merits).
196. Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, Judicial Conference of the U.S., Call for
Comments, 131 F.R.D. 335 (1990).
197. GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE (2d ed.
1994); JEROLD S. SOLOVY & CHARLES M. SHAFFER, JR., RULE 11 AND OTHER SANCTIONS:
NEW ISSUES IN FEDERAL LITIGATION (1987); GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS:
CASE LAW PERSPECTIVES AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES (Richard G. Johnson ed., 3d ed. 2004).
198. See Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11—Some “Chilling”
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1325–38
(1986) (discussing the application of Rule 11 during the first two years after it was amended).
199. See Mark Spiegel, The Rule 11 Studies and Civil Rights Cases: An Inquiry into the
Neutrality of Procedural Rules, 32 CONN. L. REV. 155, 156 (1999) (suggesting that civil rights
cases involve a disproportionate number of Rule 11 motions).
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B. Reforming Rule 11
One thought was to fully restore the discretion of the trial judge
being asked to impose sanctions on an adversary. It was also
suggested that the hostility might be reduced by a safe harbor
provision that would require sanctions motions to be made promptly
in direct response to the challenged action of counsel, and that a
modest time would be allowed for the withdrawal of the challenged
motion or allegation if the moving party detected that the sanctions
motion might have merit. The Advisory Committee circulated a draft
to that effect and received more comments. Hearings were held. We
made revisions in response to the comments and recommended a
draft to the Standing Committee that included the safe harbor
provision and a modest constraint on judicial discretion in the
administration of the rule. The Standing Committee debated the draft
at length and made further revisions, including the restoration of
200
judicial discretion. The draft as revised became law in 1993, over the
dissents of Justices Scalia and Thomas, who vigorously protested that
the revision was premature and that more trial lawyers needed to be
201
punished. The factual basis of their opinion was not disclosed; they
clearly disregarded the data gathered by the Administrative Office. I
could not help but notice that neither was an experienced litigator.
Whether our 1993 revision of Rule 11 was benign I leave to
202
others to say. It did for at least a time quell the concern for the
civility of the federal legal process. For better or worse, the rule
apparently continued to impede the assertion of civil rights claims of
203
employees by contingent fee lawyers reluctant to risk sanctions. It
did not succeed in settling the law on sanctions. For example,
questions remained about whether the need for a separate motion on

200. For a review of all the changes, see generally Georgene M. Vairo, The New Rule 11:
Past as Prologue?, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 39 (1994).
201. Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 507–10 (1993)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
202. More tinkering would be needed. See Maureen N. Armour, Practice Makes Perfect:
Judicial Discretion and the 1993 Amendments to Rule 11, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677, 777–81
(1996) (proposing a method to make the enforcement of Rule 11 more predictable and
consistent). A later assessment is Margaret L. Sanner & Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Rule Revision,
37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 573 (2004), which argues that although the 1993 amendments seem to have
corrected the problems with the 1983 amendments, “the experience with the 1983 amendment
may have undermined confidence in the rule revision process of judges, counsel and litigants.”
Id. at 574.
203. For thoughtful consideration of the issue, see generally Spiegel, supra note 199.
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sanctions was indispensable and whether the safe harbor provision
204
was to be strictly enforced.
C. Inherent Judicial Power
And it did not calm the Justices who had in 1991 chosen to
disregard the constraining text of Rule 11 to hold, over the dissent of
Justice Scalia and others, that federal district judges have inherent
power to punish lawyers and their clients for persisting in the
presentation of a frivolous—indeed fraudulent—defense, sometimes
205
in the face of orders of the court. The Court observed that the
conduct to be punished in the case presented included much conduct
not reached by Rule 11 because it was not reflected in pleadings or
motions, nor was it entirely within reach of the contempt power. The
Court concluded that neither Rule 11 nor the statute forbidding
206
lawyers to engage in vexatious behavior was applicable to much of
the misconduct, but that this lack of explicit authority should not
preclude a court from doing whatever was necessary to prevent
207
abuse. The Court urged judges to use Rule 11 when applicable but
not to be constrained by its limitation in circumstances in which
208
lawyers needed to be punished. In so holding, the Court relied in
209
part on its earlier decision upholding the power of the district court
to dismiss a civil claim for failure to prosecute even though the
defendant had made no motion to dismiss, notwithstanding the
explicit language of Rule 41(b) requiring such a motion as a
precondition to dismissal. Implicit in the Court’s holding was the

204. See Danielle Hart, Still Chilling After All These Years: Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and Its Impact on Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs After the 1993 Amendments, 37
VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 42–49 (2002) (discussing the split in the federal courts of appeal over the safe
harbor provisions).
205. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45–46 (1991). Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Kennedy and Souter dissented from the Court’s decision, id. at 60 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting), alongside a separate dissent from Justice Scalia, id. at 58 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
206. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006).
207. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50 (“But if in the informed discretion of the court, neither the
statute nor the Rules are up to the task [of sanctioning an attorney for bad conduct], the court
may safely rely on its own inherent power.”).
208. Id.
209. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962) (“The authority of a court to
dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an ‘inherent power,’
governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their
own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”).
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suggestion that Rule 11 might perhaps be deleted as an unnecessary
impediment to judges seeking to do the right thing.
VIII. THE SUPREME COURT’S ROLE AS PROCEDURAL LAWMAKER:
RULES 56 AND 8
A. Rule 56: The 1986 Trilogy
The relation of the rulemakers to the Supreme Court was of
greatest concern in the Advisory Committee’s consideration of Rule
56. The concern was aroused by a trilogy of cases handed down by the
210
Supreme Court in 1986. The Advisory Committee viewed those
decisions as revising the rule to permit district judges to render
summary judgments more freely than the Court’s previous
interpretations of the rule’s text seemed to allow—and, in many
211
minds, including mine, more freely than the text of the rule could
reasonably be said to intend. The trilogy proved to be a foretaste of
another, even more radical, revision of the Civil Rules that the Court
212
213
would fashion in 2007 and 2009.
Rule 56, governing summary judgment, had been promulgated in
its original form in 1938 as an adoption of a procedure used in

210. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
211. See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 74 (1990) (arguing that the costs of the new summary judgment
standard will outweigh the benefits); Miller, supra note 43, at 1073–74 (noting that an expansion
of summary judgment “not only would be unfortunate, but would be completely inconsistent
with the philosophy and principles of the Federal Rules”); Melissa L. Nelken, One Step
Forward, Two Steps Back: Summary Judgment After Celotex, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 83 (1988)
(claiming that the standard for admissibility in summary judgment proceedings “has no support
in Rule 56”); D. Michael Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: A Summary
Judgment on the Supreme Court’s New Approach to Summary Judgment, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 35,
35 (1988) (arguing that the new summary judgment standard favors defendants over plaintiffs).
See generally Steven A. Childress, A New Era for Summary Judgments, 116 F.R.D. 183 (1987)
(arguing that the new Supreme Court decisions will lead to an increase in the number of
summary judgment motions that are granted); Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on Summary
Judgment: Has There Been a Material Change?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 770 (1988) (discussing
the impact of Anderson, Matsushita, and Celotex on how courts should approach summary
judgment motions).
212. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Edward Cavanagh argues that in
Twombly “the Supreme Court changed its tune dramatically” on pleading requirements.
Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Courts, 82 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 877, 878 (2008).
213. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
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England for a half century and in numerous states. Its aim was to
enable the trial judge to spare the court and the parties the cost of a
trial when its outcome was certain. A classic 1940 interpretation said
that “[i]ts purpose is not to cut litigants off from their right of trial by
215
jury if they really have evidence which they will offer on a trial.”
The aim was to inquire before trial, but after discovery, whether such
evidence existed. The moving party assumed the burden “to show
216
that there is no genuine issue as to any material issue of fact.”
The 1986 opinions of the Court rewriting Rule 56 have been
more frequently cited “than any judicial decisions in the history of
217
American jurisprudence.” Respected scholars saw the opinions as
having the effect of reviving the fact-pleading standards that were the
primary feature of the nineteenth-century codes that had often led to
decisions based on perceived flaws in the texts of complaints and
218
answers.
B. Revising Rule 56?
The Advisory Committee believed that, among other effects, the
trilogy’s widening of the summary judgment procedure rendered Rule
56 misleading. It questioned whether lawyers could retain faith in the
text crafted through the rulemaking process established by Congress.
To many, in deciding to depart from the text of the Rule, the Court
seemed to have manifested a measure of disrespect for a rulemaking
214. See John A. Bauman, The Evolution of the Summary Judgment Procedure: An Essay
Commemorating the Centennial Anniversary of Keating’s Act, 31 IND. L.J. 329, 344 (1956)
(asserting that early summary judgment procedure in England reached “its ultimate
extension . . . in the United States by the adoption of Federal Rule 56”); Charles E. Clark &
Charles U. Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 YALE L.J. 423, 423 (1929) (examining “the
rules and decisions concerning summary procedure in the jurisdictions where it ha[d] already
been adopted” by 1929, which included England and several American states such as New
Jersey, New York, and Michigan).
215. Whitaker v. Coleman, 115 F.2d 305, 307 (5th Cir. 1940).
216. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2).
217. Adam N. Steinman, An Ounce of Prevention: Solving Some Unforeseen Problems with
the Proposed Amendments to Rule 56 and the Federal Summary Judgment Process, 103 NW. U.
L. REV. COLLOQUY 230, 230 (2008), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/
2008/45/LRColl2008n45Steinman.pdf (citing Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of
Celotex: Reconsidering Summary Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 81, 143 (2006)).
218. Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 435, 437 (1986); see also Miller, supra note 43, at 1016–19
(discussing historical summary-judgment procedures and suggesting that Rule 56 was adopted
to balance out the new generous pleading and joinder requirements, which would not
sufficiently terminate frivolous claims before trial).
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process that had been designed to assure the well-informed
disinterest of those responsible for the creation and revision of
transsubstantive procedural rules. Because the extension of the
summary judgment rule diminished the prospects of many kinds of
219
plaintiffs, the three decisions together could also be seen to reflect a
substantive political agenda to assist the contemporaneous
deregulation movement.
Among my tasks in my first years as Reporter was considering
how to rewrite the pertinent language of Rule 56 to make it consistent
with the three Supreme Court decisions. The Advisory Committee
was moved to accept the Court’s dictation, and I tried to draft a rule
more consistent with the Court’s opinions. I recall that the Advisory
Committee held one of its meetings in a conference room at the
Supreme Court. Chief Justice Rehnquist happened by and expressed
interest in our agenda. He warmly approved of the idea of rewriting
Rule 56. But he did not stay to help with the task.
The Advisory Committee did, after an extended period of study
and reflection, approve a revised draft of Rule 56. In fairness, none of
us were sure we had it right. We sought to reconcile the text of the
rule with the 1986 trilogy and also to clarify the use of the rule to
resolve specific claims or issues even when the whole case could not
220
be summarily resolved.
C. The Decision to Amend Rule 50 but Not Rule 56
We also tinkered with Rule 50 for the purpose of linking it to the
221
proposed text of Rule 56. Our proposal for Rule 50 became law, but
our proposal for Rule 56 did not. Although other questions were
discussed, the argument that seemed to prevail in the Standing
Committee against the revision of Rule 56 was that it would be
inappropriate for our committees to trespass on a lawmaking role that
the high Court had appropriated for itself. I was not the only person

219. Risinger, supra note 211, at 39 (contending that the Celotex trilogy “introduced a
procedure which is asymmetrical, grossly favoring defendants over plaintiffs no matter which
party is the movant”).
220. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, FED. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
MEETING OF APRIL 13–15, 1992, MINUTES OF MEETING, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesandPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV04-1992-min.pdf.
221. See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions:
An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
2067, 2109–10 (1989) (observing the “significant relationship between Rule 56 and Rule 50” and
detailing the advantages that would result from “uniting the terminology” of the two rules).

CARRINGTON IN FINAL.DOC

648

11/29/2010 6:56:44 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:597

present who was resistant to what seemed to be misplaced modesty
and deference by those to whom Congress had assigned the role of
disinterested drafting of procedural law for its nonpartisan approval.
The premise of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 that still governs
the Judicial Conference is that courts of first instance should be
bound to adhere to preexisting procedure rules crafted by the
Conference and its committees but subject to Supreme Court
approval and congressional acquiescence, just as they are bound to
respect and enforce congressional legislation. The Supreme Court
seemed to have departed from that premise in the 1986 trilogy; it was
seen by many to have rewritten Rule 56 in a moment of judicial
222
activism. The Advisory Committee has in recent times reflected,
perhaps at length, on possible revisions of Rule 56, and modest
223
changes are due to take effect in 2010. But it seems that no
substantial changes considered to date by the Advisory Committee
can be validated by reference to empirical data gathered by the
Federal Judicial Center. Quibbling continues over the auxiliary verbs
embedded in the text. Judge Brock Hornby has advanced a worthy
suggestion that summary judgment proceedings be made more
transparent by requiring public hearings before Article III judges on
224
such motions. Alas, that suggestion may be too radical to gain
traction.
D. Twombly: The Supreme Court Rewrites Rule 8
If there was doubt that the Court was rewriting the Civil Rules to
conform to the political preferences of a majority of the Justices, the
doubt was resolved in 2007 and 2009. Its 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic
225
Corp. v. Twombly, requiring that pleading be plausible to the judge,
rested in part on the fact that the claim was one arising under the
federal antitrust law. The majority of the Court expressed skepticism
222. For an in-depth analysis of the term “judicial activism” and its political implications,
see generally Neil S. Siegel, Interring the Rhetoric of Judicial Activism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 555
(2010).
223. See Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919,
1945 (2009) (“[T]he federal rulemakers are now readying to amend Rule 56, with a projected
effective date of December 1, 2010. They would include new procedures requiring parties to
state the facts assertedly uncontested and to respond thereto; the rule also would clarify judicial
options when a party fails to respond to a motion and would recognize the practice of moving
for partial summary judgment.” (footnote omitted)).
224. D. Brock Hornby, Summary Judgments Without Illusions, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 273, 284–
86 (2010).
225. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
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about the virtue of antitrust plaintiffs as a group. This skepticism was
apparently sufficient to justify what the Court saw as a more-rigorous
application of Rules 8 and 12—namely, a greater readiness to render
226
judgments on the pleadings—to antitrust plaintiffs’ suspect claims.
This approach, departing from the aim of transsubstantivity
227
embedded in the 1934 Act, would foreclose wasteful discovery by
plaintiffs deemed by the judge to be unlikely to be able to find the
requisite evidence of conspiratorial misconduct even by free use of
discovery.
The Court in Twombly took no notice of the efforts to reform
discovery practice in which the Advisory Committee has been
engaged since the “judicial case management” reforms of 1983, but
relied on Judge Easterbrook’s unfounded 1989 declaration that the
228
Civil Rules are not working. No notice was taken by the Court of
the 1993 amendments to the discovery rules with which we had
229
addressed the issues raised by Judge Easterbrook. Given all the
reforms in place, Professor Thomas Rowe was moved to observe that
“[d]iscovery must be a fearsome Gulliver to require all those
230
strings . . . to tie him down.” Nor did the Court take notice of the
mass of data calling into question Judge Easterbrook’s assessment, or
of the fact that Lord Harry Woolf of Barnes had in the 1990s studied

226. Id. at 557–60 (holding that “something beyond the mere possibility of loss of causation
must be alleged, lest a plaintiff with ‘a largely groundless claim’ be allowed to” take up other
people’s time (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005))); see also Stephen
B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 549
(“[E]ven if animated by the perceived substantive or procedural needs of antitrust law and
litigation, Twombly’s choices cannot comfortably be confined to that context by reason of
another foundational assumption, one that the Court has emphatically endorsed in the pleading
context on more than one occasion. General rules made through the Enabling Act Process can
only be changed through that process (or by legislation).” (footnote omitted)).
227. See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
228. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559, 560 n.6.; supra note 134.
229. This oversight was promptly noted in Cavanagh, supra note 163, at 573–75, but not by
the Court. Also unnoticed were reforms of state laws permitting, in limited circumstances,
prefiling discovery. See Scott Dodson, Federal Pleading and State Presuit Discovery, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 43, 45–46 (2010) (“[M]any state rules permit presuit discovery, and several do
so for the express purpose of drafting a sufficient complaint.”).
230. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Authorized Managerialism Under the Federal Rules—and the
Extent of Convergence with Civil-Law Judging, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 191, 202 (2007).
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231

the federal court experience before importing the practice of case
232
management into the United Kingdom’s Civil Procedure Act 1997.
E. Substance, Not Mere Procedure? Consequences for Antitrust
Law Enforcement
The Court’s opinion in Twombly also showed surprising
disregard for the character of antitrust law that led to a contrary
position in 1962, when the Court cautioned that “summary
procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation in
which motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the
hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the
233
234
plot.” That 1962 caution is no less apt in 2010. But whereas the
Court in 1962 had seen a duty to interpret the Civil Rules to favor
antitrust law enforcement in the setting of a motion to avoid trial, the
Court in 2007 saw itself as having a contrary duty to protect business
firms from the expense even of enduring the discovery process in an
antitrust case if, in a court’s intuitive judgment, the claim seemed
unlikely to be a winner. Never mind that withholding access to
discovery will inevitably prevent some meritorious claims from being
heard and will relax business entities’ concern for the legal
consequences of schemes abusing economic power. Never mind that
the European Union is now finding it increasingly important to
235
enhance private enforcement of its competition law.
231. See THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL
REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND
WALES (1996).
232. Civil Procedure Act 1997, c. 12 (U.K.); Déirdre Dwyer, Introduction to THE CIVIL
PROCEDURE RULES TEN YEARS ON 1, 9–14 (Déirdre Dwyer ed., 2009). One commentator has
reported that the practice has been less effective than hoped. See Adrian Zuckerman, Litigation
Management under the CPR: A Poorly-Used Management Infrastructure, in THE CIVIL
PROCEDURE RULES TEN YEARS ON, supra, at 89, 89 (contending that the civil procedure
reforms had “failed to achieve the hoped for benefits”).
233. Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1961).
234. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Pleading Problem in Antitrust Cases and Beyond, 95
IOWA L. REV. BULL. 55, 66 (2010), http://www.uiowa.edu/~ilr/bulletin/ILRB_95_Hovenkamp
.pdf (concluding that although “Twombly clearly reached the correct conclusion . . . it could
have done less damage to the values of notice pleading stated in the Federal Rules had it
focused more narrowly on the mechanisms by which anticompetitive agreements are proven”).
Hovenkamp distinguishes geographic market division from parallel pricing: “For all of [the
Court’s] lengthy discussion about the facts essential to a good complaint, the Supreme Court
paid little attention to the difference between price fixing and market division.” Id. at 62.
235. See Janet L. McDavid & Howard Weber, E.U. Private Actions, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 25,
2005, at 13 (“Europe’s competition law leaders have indicated that enhancing private
enforcement is one of their top priorities.”).
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F. The Role of the Court in Legislating New Pleading Rules
The opinion of the Court in Twombly manifested an even more
obvious and drastic disregard of the text of Rule 8 than the disregard
236
of Rule 56 that the Court had manifested in 1986. Rule 8 is the
237
keystone of civil procedure under the 1938 Civil Rules scheme. The
Court did not observe the dictum of the late Chief Justice Rehnquist
that access to discovery could not be restricted without an
238
amendment of Rules 8 and 9. As recently as 2002, the Court had
unanimously confirmed that the only means available for foreclosing
239
discovery was a summary judgment under Rule 56.
Professors Kevin Clermont and Stephen Yeazell have forcefully
noted a basic problem with the Court’s disregard for the text of Rule
240
8. They argue that Rule 8 authorizes prediscovery judgments only
when the facts alleged in a complaint are legally insufficient: if
everything alleged were true, the plaintiff would still lose on the
241
merits. A test of plausibility empowers judges to terminate a civil
case if they are unwilling to consider the possibility that the plaintiff
would be able to prove the allegations. This is not to be mistaken for
a revival of the nineteenth-century code-pleading requirement that
facts be pleaded in sufficient detail to signal the issues to be addressed
by evidence presented at trial, although the phrase “heightened fact
pleading” sometimes used to describe Twombly suggests that
242
connection. Because the decision of the district court invoking the
heightened pleading standard is a decision on an issue of law and not

236. See cases cited supra note 210.
237. WRIGHT, supra note 26, at 467.
238. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163,
168–69 (1993).
239. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S 506, 512–13 (2002); see also Crawford-El v.
Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998) (“[S]ummary judgment serves as the ultimate screen to weed
out truly insubstantial lawsuits prior to trial.”).
240. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 4 (detailing the Court’s recent pleading cases and
contending that these cases have destabilized the civil litigation system).
241. See id. at 825 (describing the original conception of Rule 8’s pleading requirements as
giving “fair notice of the pleader’s basic contentions” and “pass[ing] most of the screening
function from the threshold to the later stages of litigation”).
242. See id. at 841–42 (stressing that measuring plausibility “lies entirely in the mind of the
beholder” and that beholders “wearing judicial robes ha[ve] precious little interpretive guidance
given the measure’s novelty in the law”).
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on an issue of fact, a likely consequence of Twombly will be a
243
significant increase in the rate of civil appeals.
Nor did the Court acknowledge that stare decisis has long been
244
said to have special value when judges are interpreting legislation, a
principle perhaps having special application to legal texts the Court
itself has promulgated, with the assent of Congress, on the advice of
disinterested and well-informed experts.
The Court’s disregard of Congress and its own precedents in rewriting antitrust law in Twombly was dramatized by its
contemporaneous decision, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights,
245
Ltd., applying the law enacted by Congress to impose heightened
246
pleading requirements in private securities fraud actions. The

243. See Kevin M. Clermont, Three Myths About Twombly–Iqbal 9–10 (Jul. 6, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=1613327; see also Jason Bartlett, Comment, Into the Wild: The Uneven and Self-Defeating
Effects of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 73, 109 (2009) (“Where
dismissals are granted with prejudice, the appeals process will sometimes interfere with the
pursuit of limiting costs.”). Compare Issacharoff & Lowenstein, supra note 211, at 73–75
(contending that the broad concept of summary judgment promulgated by the trilogy will
effectively reduce unnecessary litigation, but not without counterbalancing consequences), with
D. Theodore Rave, Note, Questioning the Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
875, 875 (2006) (questioning the idea that a robust summary-judgment regime leads to increased
litigation efficiency and concluding that more empirical data is needed to make an informed
judgment).
244. See Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996) (“Once we have determined a
statute’s meaning, we adhere to our ruling under the doctrine of stare decisis . . . . One reason
that we give great weight to stare decisis in the area of statutory construction is that ‘Congress is
free to change this Court’s interpretation of its legislation.’” (quoting Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois,
431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977))); see also Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 259 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (contending that stare decisis concerns common to statutory interpretation cases
should not be diminished “in the case of a procedural rule”).
245. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
246. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.), requires plaintiffs
invoking federal securities laws to “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006). In
Tellabs, Inc., Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, held:
It does not suffice that a reasonable factfinder plausibly could infer from the
complaint’s allegations the requisite state of mind. Rather, to determine whether a
complaint’s scienter allegations can survive threshold inspection for sufficiency, a
court governed by § 21D(b)(2) must engage in a comparative evaluation; it must
consider, not only inferences urged by the plaintiff . . . but also competing inferences
rationally drawn from the facts alleged. An inference of fraudulent intent may be
plausible, yet less cogent than other, nonculpable explanations for the defendant’s
conduct. To qualify as “strong” within the intendment of § 21D(b)(2), we hold, an
inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—it must be
cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.
Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 314.

CARRINGTON IN FINAL.DOC

2010]

11/29/2010 6:56:44 PM

POLITICS AND CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES

653

Justices could hardly have failed to notice that Congress knows how
to impose more rigorous procedural requirements in a substancespecific class of cases and had declined to impose any such
requirements on antitrust plaintiffs.
Nor did the Court in Twombly observe that its assessment of the
plausibility of a plaintiff’s allegations cast the Justices, as well as the
trial judge, into the factfinding role of the civil jury. Scholars also
observed that oversight in an unrelated case in which the Justices
viewed the films of an automobile accident to decide for themselves
247
whether there was fault. Subsequent viewing of the film by diverse
others demonstrated that reasonable minds could differ and that the
differences were not without relationship to demographic
248
differences. Similarly, the Court in 2010 yielded to the temptation to
preempt the discretion of federal trial judges on such questions as
249
whether a television camera might be allowed in a courtroom or
250
whether to award an enhanced fee to a civil rights attorney.
The Court also disregarded the text of Rule 9. That Rule has
always modified the basic principle of Rule 8 by setting a heightened
standard of pleading for fraud. The 1995 securities law enacted by
Congress was in this respect merely an elaboration and reinforcement
251
of Rule 9. According to the rule, fraud victims should be able to tell
us on which bits of disinformation they relied. Professor Spencer has

247. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378–81 (2007) (holding that the court of appeals should
have “viewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape,” which, in the Court’s view, “quite
clearly contradict[ed]” the respondent’s claim that the chase created little threat to other
motorists or pedestrians).
248. See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going
to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 903–
06 (2009) (arguing that in Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), the Court “invoked brute sense
impressions to justify its decision,” yet when the videotape was allowed to speak for itself in an
empirical study “what it sa[id] depend[ed] on to whom it [was] speaking”). These authors polled
1,350 citizens who viewed the film. Id. at 845. Although a majority drew the same conclusion as
the majority of the Court, their reactions were shown to reflect differences of class, race, and
party affiliation. Id. at 903.
249. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 705, 714–15 (2010) (per curiam).
250. See Perdue v. Kenny A., 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1676 (2010); see also Paul Gewirtz, Op-Ed,
Supreme Court Press, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2010, at A23 (citing Kenny A. as an example of “lower
profile” judicial activism, which should receive more attention “because it is another important
way the current Supreme Court is using its power to shape and restrict government decisions”).
251. See Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 612 (2002)
(“The general particularity requirement of the PSLRA was designed to codify Rule 9(b)’s
application to securities fraud cases.”).
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rightly questioned how there can be yet another specially heightened
252
standard not expressed in Rule 9.
G. Substantive Political Consequences
The Court’s plausibility standard has posed a serious problem for
private enforcers of antitrust law, a body of law that, as enacted in the
253
nineteenth century, depends heavily on private enforcement.
Antitrust law requires the antitrust plaintiff to learn what the
defendant alone may know. Professor Scott Dodson has aptly
described the relationship between the parties as an “information
254
asymmetry,”
which is just what the discovery rules were
promulgated to correct.
And one is also left to wonder what the Court proposes to do
with plaintiffs who present as their complaint one of the forms
appended to the Civil Rules as models of what is expected of
pleaders. Form 11, for example, merely alleges that the defendant
255
negligently drove a motor vehicle into the plaintiff. This pleading
may not meet the Court’s new standard.
H. Next Comes Iqbal
One who shared the politics of procedural lawmakers such as
Bentham, Field, Pound, and Clark could hope that Twombly was just

252. Spencer, supra note 103, at 473–77. The special standard applicable to habeas corpus
proceedings under Habeas Rule 2(c) is also notable. Id. at 477–78.
253. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION
57–62 (2005); see also PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF
ANTITRUST LAW § 3.03 (3d ed. 2004) (implying that private enforcement is crucial to antitrust
law by noting that treble damages are a statutory “lure” to “energize” private antitrust
litigation). See generally THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND
RELATED STATUTES 34–35 (Earl W. Kintner ed., 1978) (stressing that the inclusion of a private
right of action in the Sherman Act was intended to deter antitrust violations, and that private
litigation has been significant in the development of antitrust case law).
254. Scott Dodson, Essay, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA.
L. REV. IN BRIEF 135, 139 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/07/09/
dodson.pdf (quoting Professor Randy Picker in challenging “the Court’s suspicions that the
[Twombly] pleading standard only will bar cases that have no ‘reasonably founded hope’ of
‘reveal[ing] relevant evidence’ in discovery” (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 559 (2007))). Professor Spencer added that “[w]hen such information is unknown or
unknowable from the plaintiff’s perspective at the pleading stage, the doctrine is too unforgiving
and unaccommodating, leaving plaintiffs with potentially valid claims with no access to the
system.” A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 36
(2009).
255. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11.
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an antitrust case to be understood as an expression of the Court’s
ambition to protect business interests from claims brought under a
federal law of which the Justices disapprove, and not as an assault on
the Civil Rules and the political process by which those laws were
256
made. But the Court’s 2009 opinion in Ashcroft v. Iqbal dissolved
that hope.
Iqbal’s allegation that the defendants were among the public
officials responsible for his harsh treatment when there was no
evidence legitimating his arrest as a terrorist in violation of federal
law seemed to be, in the Court’s view, unworthy of belief and
therefore unworthy of investigation through the use of the discovery
257
rules.
The defendants’ qualified immunity as public officials
ostensibly doing their duty became, in the Court’s opinion, an
absolute immunity depriving Iqbal of access to the evidence he would
have needed to prove his allegations. The Court worked this
deprivation despite the defendants’ concession that they would be
liable if they had knowledge of the mistreatment of Iqbal and had
been deliberately indifferent to his mistreatment. Because a majority
of the Justices found Iqbal’s allegations implausible, the Court
directed the district court to terminate his case prior to factual
investigation. This action was inconsistent with the text of Rule 8,
which explicitly entitles Iqbal to proceed to prove the facts alleged if
258
they would entitle him to relief. The Court’s decisions disregarding
the text of Rule 8 as interpreted by generations of federal judges
make its earlier 1986 disregard of the law of Rule 56 seem restrained
in comparison.
I.

Up with Deregulation! Down with Private Law Enforcement!

Advocates of deregulation may well celebrate the opinion in
Iqbal as a major step in the dismantling of the system of private
enforcement of public law established in 1938. It is a happy day for
Vice President Quayle’s Council on Competitiveness, which sought in
1990 to enhance business profits by disabling citizen plaintiffs from
enforcing laws made to protect them from the consequences of risky
profit seeking. Gregory Katsas, a former assistant attorney general in

256. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
257. See id. at 1950–51 (concluding that Iqbal’s complaint was deficient under Rule 8
because it had not “‘nudged [his] claims’ of invidious discrimination ‘across the line from
conceivable to plausible’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)).
258. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
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the George W. Bush administration, has made the astonishing
prediction that overruling Twombly and Iqbal “would threaten to
upset pleading rules that have been well-settled for decades, and
thereby open the floodgates for what lawyers call ‘fishing
expeditions’—intrusive and expensive discovery into implausible and
259
In what decades has Mr. Katsas been
insubstantial claims.”
260
practicing? Has he read Rule 1? Supporters of the opinions have
even argued, in a gesture of remarkable incivility, that the Court’s
activism in preventing private law enforcement is a response to the
261
need to fight the War on Terror. Those who respect Rule 8 favor
terrorism!
J.

Down with the Rulemaking Process?

The Court seems, not in these cases alone, to have lost the selfdiscipline required to show appropriate respect for the procedural
lawmaking system Congress established in 1934. And the Court has
not observed the principle of self-restraint in respecting the work of
262
the Judicial Conference that it had voiced as recently as 1999. That
263
principle is now one of convenience to the Court. A majority of the
Justices seem unaware of their duty to obey and enforce the law made
by the humble rulemaking process. As Judge Anthony Scirica has
recently observed,

259. Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 33
(2009) (statement of Gregory G. Katsas, Former Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t. of Justice).
260. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“[The Rules] shall be construed and administered to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”).
261. See William McGurn, Terror by Trial Lawyer, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2009, at A17
(speculating that a legislative proposal to relax pleading standards in response to Iqbal might
encourage captured al Qaeda operatives to “go on discovery expeditions against, say, Gen.
David Petraeus or Defense Secretary Robert Gates,” potentially diminishing “the ability of
these men to prosecute the war”).
262. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 861 (1999) (“The nub of our position is
that we are bound to follow Rule 23 as we understood it upon its adoption, and that we are not
free to alter it except through the process prescribed by Congress in the Rules Enabling Act.”).
263. The Court has recently expressed deference to the statutory rulemaking process to
consider fashioning a new rule governing the appealability of discovery orders. See Mohawk
Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 609 (2009) (citing rulemaking as “the preferred means
for determining whether and when prejudgment orders should be immediately appealable”).
Professor Scott Dodson rightly characterized this as ironic. See Melinda Hanson, Order to
Disclose Privileged Material Is Not Subject to Interlocutory Review, 78 U.S.L.W. 1345, 1346
(2009).
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The [1934] Act was a brilliant solution to the making of procedural
law. Described as a treaty between the legislative and judicial
branches, it provides a dispassionate, neutral forum that allows
procedural law to be written in a deliberate and thoughtful manner.
Key members of the Executive Branch (such as the Deputy
Attorney General and the Solicitor General) have seats on the
Rules Committees. The openness mandated by Congress invites
public comment, and new rules are enacted only after approval by
the Judicial Conference, adoption by the Supreme Court, and after a
six-month interval while Congress considers whether to permit the
rules to become law. All of this ensures the rigorous scrutiny and
public review essential to establish the credibility and legitimacy of
264
the rulemaking process.

The Court visibly lacks sufficient deference for the other
branches of the national government or for the Judicial Conference of
the United States to observe such a treaty. Indeed, that the Advisory
Committee was fully aware of Judge Easterbrook’s views and had
decided that the concerns did not justify revision of Rule 8 was
apparently not a matter of concern to the Court. Perhaps their lack of
trial and legislative experience has interfered with the Justices’ ability
to conceptualize the effects of their rulings on actual cases. Other
recent instances indicate the Justices’ diminished regard for
subordinate judges and humble jurors selected to assess the
265
credibility of evidence. Still others confirm the Court’s lack of
266
deference to Congress and the legislative process.

264. To Speak with One Clear Voice: The Executive Committee’s Role in the Judiciary,
THIRD BRANCH, Dec. 2009, at 1, 11 (interviewing Chief Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair,
Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States); see also Stempel, supra
note 29, at 184 (“When rulemaking proceeds by Enabling Act process rather than judicial fiat, a
substantially more diverse cast of characters participates.”). But see Robert G. Bone, The
Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy,
87 GEO. L.J. 887, 954 (1999) (arguing for a more-centralized rulemaking process by the courts
and objecting to intrusions by Congress and political interest groups, lamenting that
“rulemaking today more closely resembles a legislative process . . . than the process of
principled deliberation it was originally conceived to be”); Richard L. Marcus, Reform Through
Rulemaking?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 901, 943 (2002) (“Anyone who expects rulemaking to produce
[monumental] breakthroughs . . . in the new century is going to be disappointed unless dramatic
change occurs. . . . At the same time, forecasts of doom seem too dire.”).
265. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378–80 (2007) (describing videotape evidence
presented to the jury, which the Justices themselves watched); see also Kahan et al., supra note
248, at 839–40 (excerpting portions of oral argument in Scott in which several Justices discussed
their reactions to the videotape with respondent’s counsel).
266. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION’S POWER: THE SUPREME
COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES 11 (2002) (arguing that the Court has thwarted Congress’s
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K. Consequences for State Law Enforcement
Indeed, the Court’s revision of Rule 8 treads on the power of
state legislatures, too. The celebrated decision in Erie Railroad Co. v.
267
Tompkins, contemporaneous with the promulgation of the Civil
Rules, noticed the problem that federal common law decisions in
diversity cases trespassed on state sovereignty. As applied in diversity
cases, the Court-created Twombly-Iqbal standard will prevent
discovery by some plaintiffs seeking to serve the public in their
268
advancement of civil claims arising under state law.
IX. COMPARE THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT OF 1925
A. Arbitration Law as Written by Congress
The Supreme Court’s decisions rewriting the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure—in disregard of the role of other branches of
government and to protect business interests from the costs
associated with effective private enforcement of public law—should
not be viewed in isolation. While the Court was rewriting Rule 56 and
then Rule 8 (texts that it had promulgated in 1938) to ease the
concerns of business interests, it was pursuing the same political
objective in its rewriting of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925
269
(FAA).

legislative authority through an unjustified extension of state immunity); Paul D. Carrington &
Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess: Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme
Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 590 (2009) (commenting that it is “no wonder that there is
unrest among citizens mindful of the large political role that the Court has come to perform”
and proposing to overhaul laws that currently give the Court “virtually absolute control over its
docket”).
267. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“[W]hether the law of the State
shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a
matter of federal concern. There is no federal general common law.”).
268. Cf. Estate of Tucker v. Interscope Records, Inc., 515 F.3d 1019, 1033 n.14 (9th Cir.
2008) (finding that mere allegations of malicious prosecution were insufficient, without further
evidentiary support, to survive a motion for summary judgment in a diversity case). The
Washington Supreme Court has explicitly declined to adopt the Iqbal standard in reading that
state’s version of Rule 12(b)(6). See McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 233 P.3d 861, 864
(Wash. 2010) (en banc) (“The appropriate forum for revising the Washington rules is the rulemaking process. This process permits policy considerations to be raised, studied, and argued in
the legal community and the community at large.” (citation omitted)).
269. Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA), Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006)); see also Paul D. Carrington, Self-Deregulation, the
“National Policy” of the Supreme Court, 3 NEV. L.J. 259, 264 (2002) (“The instrument of the
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Congress passed the FAA to foster arbitration of contract
disputes arising between business firms engaged in interstate
commerce to reverse a body of federal common law (the body of law
overruled and dissolved in 1938 in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins)
that had denied enforcement in federal courts of arbitration
agreements made prior to the existence of the dispute to be
arbitrated, often in disregard of the applicable state law of
270
contracts. As federal and state laws enacted to serve public
regulatory purposes became more numerous, business interests were
attracted to arbitration as a means of blunting the force of such laws.
Arbitration is not an absolute bar to law enforcement, but the citizen
plaintiff must share the cost of the arbitrator, any factual investigation
271
is entirely in the hands of the arbitrator, and the arbitrator is not
272
accountable for his or her fidelity to the law. Firms therefore found
it attractive to arbitrate private claims arising under state or federal
regulatory laws. With increasing frequency, firms wrote arbitration
clauses into the standard form contracts they required workers,
consumers, investors, patients, or franchisees to sign.
In 1953, the Court held that an arbitration clause in a brokerage
agreement is not binding on a plaintiff seeking recovery under the

Court’s mischief has been the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, a statute re-written by the Court
a half-century after its enactment . . . .”).
270. See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION–
NATIONALIZATION–INTERNATIONALIZATION 122–33 (1992).
271. E.g., 9 U.S.C. § 7 (giving the arbitrator the ability to summon witnesses and to compel
attendance); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 7 (2000).
272. Until 2008, it was widely held that an award might be set aside if it exhibited a
“manifest disregard of law.” E.g., Kurke v. Oscar Gruss & Son, Inc., 454 F.3d 350, 354 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (commenting that “manifest disregard” is “an extremely narrow standard of review”).
And it was assumed that a contract could provide for judicial review of fidelity to law. See, e.g.,
Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995) (“When, as
here, the parties agree contractually to subject an arbitration award to expanded judicial review,
federal arbitration policy demands that the court conduct its review according to the terms of
the arbitration contract.”). That assumption was laid to rest in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel,
Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008). There, the Court held that the FAA provides the exclusive statutory
grounds for judicial review of arbitration awards and may not be supplemented by contract. Id.
at 1400; see also Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 355 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[T]o
the extent that manifest disregard of the law constitutes a nonstatutory ground for vacatur, it is
no longer a basis for vacating awards under the FAA.”); Tom Ginsburg, The Arbitrator as
Agent: Why Deferential Review Is Not Always Pro-Arbitration 8–9 (Univ. of Chicago Law Sch.,
John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 502 (2d Series), 2009), available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/502-tg-arbitrator.pdf (noting that Hall Street “explicitly
rejects” the position that judges can “expand their monitoring of the arbitrator-agents simply
because the party-principals want them to”).
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Securities Act of 1933. That decision was widely approved and
taken to apply to claims advanced to enforce other laws enacted by
274
Congress. The Court did not preclude private arbitration between
parties reaching agreement to arbitrate an existing dispute, but it was
mindful that arbitrators may not be held accountable for their fidelity
to legislation invoked by plaintiffs and are not accountable for failing
to investigate pertinent facts.
B. The Court Rewrites the Act
In 1984, the Supreme Court for the first time held that the 1925
FAA could be invoked to bar a California state court from enforcing
California’s Franchise Investment Act, which would have invalidated
275
an arbitration clause in a standard-form franchise agreement. And
in 1989, the Court explicitly overruled its own 1953 decision to hold
273. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (“Recognizing the advantages that prior
agreements for arbitration may provide for the solution of commercial controversies, we decide
that the intention of Congress concerning the sale of securities is better carried out by holding
invalid such an agreement for arbitration of issues arising under the [Securities] Act.”),
overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). The
Wilko Court relied on language in the Securities Act declaring void any “‘stipulation’ waiving
compliance with any ‘provision’ of the Securities Act.” Id. at 434. In reaching its conclusion, the
Court appeared to follow the position taken by the Securities and Exchange Commission in its
amicus brief. See Brief for the SEC, Amicus Curiae at 18, Wilko, 346 U.S. 427 (No. 39). The
Court and lower courts have adopted similar reasoning in the context of other statutes. See, e.g.,
Boyd v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., 338 U.S. 263, 264–65 (1949) (per curiam) (holding that
contractual clauses limiting the plaintiff’s choice of venue in a suit under the Federal Employers’
Liability Act were voided by the Act’s provisions); Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire &
Co., 391 F.2d 821, 828 (2d Cir. 1968) (concluding that the antitrust claims raised by the plaintiff
were “inappropriate for arbitration” despite the existence of an arbitration clause). But see
Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F.2d 3, 6–7 (3d Cir. 1943) (“[W]e see nothing in the
wording of the Fair Labor Standards Act which precludes arbitration of claims arising under
it.”).
274. See, e.g., In re Arbitration Between AAACON Auto Transp., Inc & State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 537 F.2d 648, 654–55 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that the Interstate Commerce Act
preserved a shipper’s right to sue a carrier in any proper forum under that Act, and that the Act
therefore voided any contractual limitations on venue); Am. Safety Equip. Corp., 391 F.2d at
828 (declining to consider the plaintiff’s antitrust claims as being among those situations in
which “Congress has allowed parties to obtain the advantages of arbitration”).
275. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (“In creating a substantive rule
applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative
attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.” (footnote omitted)). The
state law in question was CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512. In 1995, the Supreme Court extended its
application of the FAA to preempt an Alabama law protecting consumers from mandatory
arbitration clauses in standard form contracts. See Allied Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513
U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (“What states may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce
all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause.
The Act makes any such state policy unlawful . . . .”).
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that the FAA empowered brokers to compel their investors to
276
arbitrate claims arising under federal securities laws. The Court
277
went on to apply the principle to other federal laws.
An arbitrator might investigate facts in dispute when a citizen
seeks to enforce the law enacted for his protection, and the arbitrator
might elect to enforce the applicable law, but an arbitrator is also free
278
to choose to do otherwise. I have heard that those providing
arbitration services offer reassurances that private citizens required to
arbitrate win a higher percentage of their cases than in litigation. A
possible explanation for that fact, if it is a fact, is that the upfront
charge for the cost of arbitration and the absence of the right to
discovery deter plaintiffs from filing any but the most assured claims.
Indeed, if it were true that plaintiffs win more readily in arbitration,
few businesses would write arbitration clauses into their standard
form contracts.
Also, arbitration is a private proceeding. One of its attractions to
predatory or risk-taking businesses is that it diminishes the likelihood
that the success of one claim by a consumer, employee, or investor
will encourage others like it. Evidence revealed to an arbitrator
remains private. Whereas a public enforcement proceeding serves to
alert the general public to the need for regulation and enables the
public to measure the usefulness of its legal institutions, secret
proceedings conceal from the public not only the risk of the harm at
issue but also the awareness that the public interest is being served by
279
the law enforcement efforts of fellow citizens.
This history of federal arbitration law since the mid-1980s tends
to confirm that the Supreme Court’s revisions of the Civil Rules have
a clearly visible political aim: to protect business firms from

276. See Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484 (“We now conclude that Wilko was incorrectly
decided and is inconsistent with the prevailing uniform construction of other federal statutes
governing arbitration agreements in the setting of business transactions.”). This overruling was
foretold in Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). There, the Court
commented that it was “difficult to reconcile Wilko’s mistrust of the arbitral process with this
Court’s subsequent decisions involving the Arbitration Act. . . . Indeed, most of the reasons
given in Wilko have been rejected subsequently by the Court as a basis for holding claims to be
nonarbitrable.” Id. at 231–32.
277. See, e.g., Allied Bruce Terminix Cos., 513 U.S. at 281.
278. See supra notes 271–74.
279. Adriaan Lanni, Note, Protecting Public Rights in Private Arbitration, 107 YALE L.J.
1157, 1161 (1999) (arguing that confidential arbitration proceedings pose such “significant
dangers” as diminished deterrence, lack of uniformity in industry standards, and stunted
development in the law).
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unwelcome private law enforcement. Never mind contrary legal
texts—whether enacted directly by Congress, promulgated by the
Court itself on the advice of the Judicial Conference and with the
tacit approval of Congress, or enacted by state legislatures to assure
the effective enforcement of state law.
Congress, under the leadership of Senator Orrin Hatch, has
intervened to protect the rights of automobile dealers to enforce the
280
Automobile Dealers Day in Court Act. And under the leadership of
Senator Chuck Grassley, Congress has assured the right of farmers to
opt out of arbitration clauses written into their printed contracts with
281
firms that buy their produce. But much state and federal law is less
282
vigorously enforced as a result of the Court’s decisions.
C. Rewriting Rules of Evidence
Meanwhile, the Court has also rewritten the Federal Rules of
Evidence to weaken and perhaps nullify federal laws dependent for
their enforcement on the use of expert opinion. District judges are to
exclude expert testimony that, on the basis of their personal scientific
283
expertise, they deem unreliable. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence was amended in 2000 in an attempt to codify the Court’s
284
rulings. The admission of expert testimony under that rule is highly

280. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorizations Act, Pub. L. No.
107-273, div. C, tit. I, § 11028, 116 Stat. 1758, 1835 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1226 (2006)).
281. See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 11005, 122
Stat. 1651, 2119 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 197c (Supp. II 2008)) (requiring any
livestock or poultry contract containing an arbitration provision to give the grower a meaningful
opportunity to decline to be bound by that provision).
282. See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 10467, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). This statute
was passed over the veto of President Clinton, who expressed concern that the bill would “have
the effect of closing the courthouse door on investors who have legitimate claims.” 141 CONG.
REC. 37,797 (1995).
283. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993) (concluding that
the district judge has the responsibility, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, to make a
“preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the [expert’s]
testimony is scientifically valid”); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141
(1999) (concluding that Daubert’s assignment of a “gatekeeping” duty to the district court judge
applies not only to scientific testimony but also to testimony based on other technical and
specialized knowledge); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997) (clarifying that the
trial court’s determination of the scientific validity of expert testimony is to be reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard, and holding that the appeals court’s scrutiny of the district court
was overly stringent).
284. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (2000); see also
Guy v. Crown Equip. Corp., 394 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Amended Rule 702 reflects the
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discretionary and dependent on the judge’s scientific competence.
Review of such rulings in the courts of appeals is, to say the least,
286
problematic, and this empowerment has contributed measurably to
287
the rise in summary judgments dismissing plaintiffs’ cases. One
effect of this reform is to magnify the political consequences of the
288
Court’s efforts to diminish access to discovery.
For example, the enforcement of some federal laws regulating
business may depend on expert economic opinions that can be
secured only from experts fully informed of the defendant’s case. The
289
Bank Merger Act, a law connecting banking and antitrust law, is a
timely example of a federal law that may have been nullified by the
Court’s rewriting of the law of evidence to require unavailable
expertise. Whether less constrained enforcement of the Act might
have diminished the impact of the 2008 economic crisis is a question
that may be worthy of consideration.
D. A Captured Court
Perhaps it is not an overstatement to say that the Supreme
Court, as much in its reinterpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act
as in its rewrite of the Civil Rules, appears to have been captured by
business interests—much like many public regulatory agencies were
captured, making citizens increasingly dependent on the system of
effective private law enforcement that emerged from the 1934 Act

Supreme Court’s decisions in Daubert and its progeny emphasizing the district courts’ broad
latitude in weighing the reliability of expert testimony for admissibility.”).
285. See Sheilah Jasanoff, Law’s Knowledge: Science for Justice in Legal Settings, 95 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH S49, S50 (2005) (observing a “disenchantment in contemporary America with the
law’s capacity to resolve the manifold technical disputes of modernity”).
286. See, e.g., Huss v. Gayden, 585 F.3d 823, 824 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (Owen, C.J.,
concurring) (describing the disagreement between the panel majority and the dissents over
whether the district judge had erred in excluding an expert’s testimony on general, rather than
specific, causation).
287. See LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CHANGES IN THE
STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE
DAUBERT DECISION 55–57 (2001) (noting an increase in summary judgments arising out of
challenges to expert evidence in the wake of Daubert).
288. PROJECT ON SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE & PUB. POLICY, DAUBERT: THE MOST
INFLUENTIAL SUPREME COURT RULING YOU’VE NEVER HEARD OF 3 (2003) (“In the
aftermath of Daubert, not only are many legitimate scientists and their work being barred from
the courtroom, but plaintiffs are being denied their day in court, unfairly in our view.”).
289. Act of May 13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129, amended by Act of Feb. 21, 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-356, 80 Stat. 7.
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and its political premises. I believe it is fair to say that the Roberts
Court since 2007 has set for itself the political goals advanced a
quarter century earlier by Vice President Quayle’s Commission
without noting that the Commission was addressing its deregulatory
recommendations to Congress, not to the Court. And it is not an
overstatement to say that the Court has in these decisions manifested
judicial activism of just the sort that conservative politicians have so
291
vigorously decried. It might be said that the Roberts Court appears
as the Quayle Commission on Competitiveness in robes.
X. PRESCRIPTIONS
The Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal
System, a think tank established in 2006, has chimed in with a
292
proposal of Civil Caseflow Management Guidelines and a set of
proposed Pilot Project Rules to which the name of the American
293
College of Trial Lawyers is also attached. Veteran litigators J.
Douglas Richards and John Vail have expressed skepticism, making

290. See Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2008, at 38, 42.
Capture was further confirmed by Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct.
876 (2010), which held that corporations have a First Amendment right to fund political
campaigns. Id. at 898. As Timothy Kuhner observed in 2007, the separation of church and state
was the primary aim of the First Amendment; yet the Court now invokes that text to forbid laws
striving to separate business and state. See Timothy K. Kuhner, The Separation of Business and
State, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2374 (2007) (“Formal separation limits the amount of control
religious authorities can exercise. The absence of formal separation with regard to monetary
influence is damning in this precise regard.”); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private
Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 209 (“The current Court is creating an ever-greater
regulation-remedy gap. It has left Congress free to regulate a wide range of subjects, but it is
engaged in a form of court stripping that reduces the possibilities for judicial enforcement of
statutory commands.”).
291. See REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., 2008 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 19 (2008), available at
http://www.gop.com/2008Platform/2008platform.pdf (“Judicial activism is a grave threat to the
rule of law because unaccountable federal judges are usurping democracy, ignoring the
Constitution and its separation of powers, and imposing their personal opinions upon the
public.”). This may be a misuse of the term “judicial activism.” See Siegel, supra note 222, at 556
(suggesting that “the rhetoric of judicial activism is deployed to condemn particular views on
particular issues and not to express a genuine commitment to judicial deference or to the ideal
of fidelity to law”); cf. David E. Bernstein, Liberals, Conservatives, and Individual Rights, CATO
INST. (June 27, 2008), http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9511 (citing examples of
conservative support for invalidating regulations and arguing that a commitment to individual
civil liberties is not monopolized by any particular ideological bloc on the Court).
292. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., CIVIL CASEFLOW
MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES (2009).
293. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS. & AM. COLL. OF TRIAL
LAWYERS, PILOT PROJECT RULES (2009).
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the not-groundless claim that the facts on the ground do not justify
294
reforms on the scale proposed by the Institute.
I agree with Richards and Vail that the case has not been made
for radical departure from the scheme established in 1938. To be sure,
times have changed. But the proposed Pilot Project Rules, like the
decisions of the Court in Twombly and Iqbal, seem to be derived not
from observable reality but from a political ideology that is resistant
to private enforcement of public law and therefore favored by the
Chamber of Commerce. Indeed, there was nothing in either Twombly
or Iqbal that had not been considered and rejected repeatedly by the
295
Advisory Committee, among others.
Professor Arthur Miller has thoughtfully prescribed diverse
actions for the Advisory Committee to consider as possible revivals of
296
the Civil Rules. But the present rulemaking system cannot alone
correct what the Supreme Court has done to impair the effective
enforcement of the substantive laws made by Congress or the states.
Given the role of the Court in the rulemaking legislative process as
established by the 1934 Act, there is simply not much that the
Advisory Committee or the Judicial Conference can reasonably be
expected to do. To restate the law of pleading as expressed in
Twombly and Iqbal would require a repudiation of the premises of
the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 and the antecedent thoughts on
procedural law reform dating from Bentham, Field, and Pound.

294. J. Douglas Richards & John Vail, A Misguided Mission to Revamp the Rules, TRIAL,
Nov. 2009, at 52, 52–54.
295. Steven Burbank observed,
Nor do I think it was fortuitous that the Court proceeded by judicial decision
rather than by remitting the issues to the Enabling Act process. As the head of the
latter the Chief Justice was well aware that the Civil Rules Committee had raised and
abandoned the possibility of amending the pleading rules a number of times,
including in the recent past. Moreover, one of the reasons for the committee’s serial
inaction—that any amendment tightening pleading would be politically controversial
and thus likely to arouse strong opposition in Congress—can only have encouraged
the Court to proceed as it did, particularly with a Democratic Congress.
It is precisely because these decisions represent an attempted power grab by the
Court in direct contravention of the process prescribed by Congress that I have
advocated legislation that would return federal pleading law to the status quo ante
until such time as amendments to the Federal Rules are proposed through the
Enabling Act process, subject to review by Congress.
Steven Burbank, Remarks to the Constitution Society (Feb. 24, 2010) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
296. Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 103–27 (2010).
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It is therefore past time for Congress to address the issues
presented to the Advisory Committee in 1985 and now elevated to
urgency by the Court’s holding in Iqbal. I therefore offer my
unqualified endorsement to the Notice Pleading Restoration Act of
297
2009 as proposed by Senator Specter and others. Or, better, to
298
Professor Stephen Burbank’s proposal. Or the Open Access Act
299
proposed by Representative Jerrold Nadler. Or possibly Professor
Martin Redish’s more radical proposal to have the Judicial
Conference report directly to Congress, with such advice as the Court
300
might wish to contribute.
Surely Redish is correct that the
responsibility for making nontranssubstantive law is constitutionally
vested in Congress, not the Court. If, for example, there is to be a
different standard for summary judgment or motions for judgment on
the pleadings applicable to antitrust cases, the institution to
promulgate such a law was and is Congress, not the Court.
One is moved to be cautious in engaging Congress in the politics
of procedural rulemaking. Alas, in another of its activist ventures as
the champion of business interests, the Court has assured the right of
those with money to dominate the election of legislators at all levels
301
of government. I do not suppose that Congressman Kastenmeier
was a victim of generous business contributions to the campaign of his
adversary, but it would be no surprise to learn that some
congresspersons in 2010 would take the risk of well-funded
opposition into account before considering rules of civil procedure
that might enhance the ability of citizens to enforce laws regulating
business.
Perhaps the Advisory Committee might be summoned to serve
Congress as a consultant in a search for an enactment that might

297. S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009).
298. Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 106 (2009) (statement of Stephen Burbank, David Berger
Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania) (proposing a draft
substitute amendment “to implement an approach that would return the law governing pleading
and pleading motions to the status quo before Twombly and Iqbal”).
299. H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009); see also Cecelia M. Assam, House Panel Delves Deeper
into Access to Courts Question, 78 U.S.L.W. 2366 (2009) (discussing House hearings on the bill).
300. MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 18, 62–85 (2009).
301. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (holding that
the congressional “prohibition on corporate independent expenditures” found at 2 U.S.C. §
441(b) constituted “a ban on speech” in violation of the First Amendment); see also supra note
290.
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bring the Court back to the mission of enforcing the rights of citizens,
as expressed by generations of law reformers and embodied in the
Rules Enabling Act of 1934, without arousing great anxieties of great
funders of political campaigns. Might Congress, for example,
empower the Court to certify to the Judicial Conference questions
about procedural rules and their possible need for reconsideration or
revision in a transparent and representative process? Would such
empowerment, by providing the Court with a self-effacing method of
addressing the politics of civil procedure, help the Court to find its
way back home to an appropriately modest role in the constitutional
scheme? It might be worth a try. Whatever the best prescription,
Congress must act or many of its laws will go down the drain of weak
enforcement that the Court has opened.

